I was just wondering why the alied picked 5 beaches to attack. Was wondering why they did not pick just one beach, landed all the troops, and went on foot and tanks up the shore line.
Would that not have minimized the loos of battleships, that was shot down with guns from the German guns. And probably also, fewer soldiers would be killed by landmines, when consentrating on one beach?
Just wondering. Is there any D Day profesionals :-) that has some stratetic knowlegde, that can explain. Maybe it was the right way to do it.
> I was just wondering why the alied picked 5 beaches to attack. Was > wondering why they did not pick just one beach, landed all the > troops, > and went on foot and tanks up the shore line.
> Would that not have minimized the loos of battleships, that was shot > down with guns from the German guns. And probably also, fewer > soldiers > would be killed by landmines, when consentrating on one beach?
> Just wondering. Is there any D Day profesionals :-) that has some > stratetic knowlegde, that can explain. Maybe it was the right way to > do it.
> Regards > Martin
I'm not a professional, but I have done a fair amount of reading on the subject, including "Decision in Normandy" which goes quite into detail about the planning process.
First off, it was necessary to get large numbers onshore before the Germans could affectivly counterattack. One beach would not have got enough boots on the ground in time. And that would have given the Germans a clear target for counterattack.
Secondly, no matter how much prep work and reconnasaince had been done, you didn't want to put all your eggs in one basket. If the landings had only taken place at Omaha, it would have been a very different day. The fact that Omaha was between two successful landings meant the delays weren't really telling on the overall progress.
The German heavy guns were not a huge impediment to shipping, as far as I know, no capital ships were lost, and from what I've read, fewer small boats were lost than forecast.
Similarly landmines weren't an issue either, there was simply too much coastline to protect for dense fields, and the Germans concentrated on Calais area sites.
The main idea was that if they built up a big enough beachhead fast enough, the Germans wouldn't be able to put hard pressure on the whole thing at once, and throw them back. The name of the game was to land a big enough force, with enough men, tanks and supplies to withstand a counterattack, or conversely make a breakout. Neither happened exactly as planned. But the size of the force meant it would have take a very large German force to push them back into the sea.
In general, when you attack on too narrow of a front it is very easy for the enemy to hit you in the flanks and pinch off the head of your attacking force.
In amphibious landings the objective is to get as much ashore as possible and to get inland as fast as possible so that you have a large enough beachhead with enough men and material to defeat or at least hold off the enemy when he counterattacks. The more beaches you use the more you can get ashore in any given period of time. If there is a holdup on one beach you can use the men and material from "easier" beaches to take care of the problem beach.
Many times the nature of the shoreline or the density of jungles or terrain inland restricts you to a narrow beach. US Army landings in the SWPA often were quite narrow for this reason. The Army had the advantage of landing on large islands and could land were there was little or no enemy. Other times landing at a narrow or otherwise poor beachhead is used as a way of surprising the enemy. The US Marine landing on Tinian on July 25, 1944 is an example. The Japanese expected them to land on one side of the island and their defense was set up accordingly. The Marines performed a feint landing on the expected side then put 2 divisions ashore through a 180 yard wide beach on the opposite side of the island. However, there were more factors than surprise to make the plan work.The Marines had artillery nearby on Saipan which they had already captured and good air support from carriers offshore. There was also no chance of Japanese reinforcements or counterattack from the sea as the US Navy had already defeated the Japanese Fleet in the Battle of the Phillipine Sea aka "The Great Marianas Turkey Shoot".
> I was just wondering why the alied picked 5 beaches to attack. Was > wondering why they did not pick just one beach, landed all the > troops, and went on foot and tanks up the shore line.
The main precedent was Operation Husky, the amphibious invasion of Sicily in 1943. Many of its principal commanders (Eisenhower, Tedder, Montgomery, Coningham etc.) also had charge of D-Day. Husky was the largest seaborne invasion to date and the first requiring co-operation between US and British high commands, as well as between all three arms (land, sea and air.) D-Day was larger still and more elaborate (cf. Mulberry artificial harbours) because of experience in Sicily (and Anzio) of delays in resupplying troops in combat. (The negative precedent, i.e. the lesson how _not_ to invade was Dieppe, 1942.)
> Would that not have minimized the loos of battleships, that was shot > down with guns from the German guns. And probably also, fewer > soldiers would be killed by landmines, when consentrating on one beach?
1. No battleships were lost to German gunfire off Normandy. Air strikes attempted to wreck all known batteries before D-Day. 2. Invasion planners attempted to forecast casualties (from all causes, not just mines) and plans were altered according to these forecasts i.e. the first plan was enlarged from three divisions on three beaches to five divisions landing simultaneously on five beaches, on this basis. It seems the planners thought that total casualties per thousand would be fewer on five beaches than on three. No one can prove whether the calculation was right or wrong, but the forecast was that casualties would not impede the invasion and this forecast turned out right. (There were heavier casualties at later, smaller invasions e.g. Arnhem and Walcheren.)
-- Don Phillipson Carlsbad Springs (Ottawa, Canada)
> I was just wondering why the alied picked 5 beaches to attack. Was > wondering why they did not pick just one beach, landed all the > troops, > and went on foot and tanks up the shore line.
> Would that not have minimized the loos of battleships, that was shot > down with guns from the German guns. And probably also, fewer > soldiers > would be killed by landmines, when consentrating on one beach?
The original plan was to land on the three beaches which became Gold Juno and Sword with three divisions. As the plan developped Montgommery and Eisenhower realised that they needed more men to go in to be successfull and so more beaches to get them in on.T he choice was going to the East (towards Le havre) or going to the west (where there were 20 miles of high cliffs.) As extending to wards Le havre would bring the troops in range of the big guns at Le Havre and leave the river Orne in the middle of the zone, it was decided that using the 4 miles of sandy beach in the middle of the 20 miles of cliff (omaha beach) , and the beach on the cotentin peninsula (Utah) that had floods behind was a better choice.
If 3 beaches weren't enough and 5 nearly went wrong I don't see just one beach being possible at all. All the available germans in the region and the two panzer divisions would have just concentrated on the trickle of men coming through the jammed up beach and pushed them back into the sea.
Don Phillipson wrote: > 1. No battleships were lost to German gunfire off Normandy. > Air strikes attempted to wreck all known batteries before D-Day.
Several ships were sunk by the Crisbeq battery behind and North of Utah in the 6 days it continued firing. The 101st attacked it on the morning of the 6th. The commander telephoned to the neighboring Azeville battery to tell them to fire on his battery. This they did and that drove the paras off. The battery held out till the 12th. We often say the ost battalions were not highly motivated but these were Georgians (Stalins birth place)perhaps they thought that any friend of Stalins was no friend of theirs.
On Oct 28, 11:06 am, "Don Phillipson" <e...@SPAMBLOCK.ncf.ca> wrote:
> The main precedent was Operation Husky, the amphibious > invasion of Sicily in 1943. Many of its principal commanders > (Eisenhower, Tedder, Montgomery, Coningham etc.) also had > charge of D-Day. Husky was the largest seaborne invasion to > date and the first requiring co-operation between US and British > high commands,
Wasn't the first Anglo-American (and Free French for that matter) landing operation Torch; the allied invasion of North Africa in 1942?
As I understand it, there was some scepticism that a combined force with different logistics, doctrine and command structures would be able to maintain cohesion, but the eventuality was that the British and Americans fought very well together.
> Wasn't the first Anglo-American (and Free French for that matter) > landing operation Torch; the allied invasion of North Africa in 1942?
By the standard of Husky (Sicily), Torch was not a joint operation. The invasion forces were all US Army, escorted by RN as well as USN ships. Torch commanders were all American like the troops. Only months later did Gen. Eisenhower set up the joint command structure that planned Husky (e.g. with AM Tedder as deputy commander.) Free French commanders had no role in planning Torch or Husky or Overlord, although they were consulted for common-sense reasons.
-- Don Phillipson Carlsbad Springs (Ottawa, Canada)
On Oct 28, 10:24 am, "Don Phillipson" <e...@SPAMBLOCK.ncf.ca> wrote:
> By the standard of Husky (Sicily), Torch was not a joint operation. > The invasion forces were all US Army,
Don, the ground forces of the Western and Center Task Force were all US Army and were under the command of Patton's II Corps, but the Eastern Naval Task Force was combined US (elements 34th Division) and British Army (British 78th Division and two commandos) under the coomand of Anderson's First British Army. Nominally overall command of ground forces was Anderson, with Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander.
On Oct 27, 1:50 pm, Martin Rievers <mar...@rievers.net> wrote:
> I was just wondering why the alied picked 5 beaches to attack.
Basically, it was to have enough room to attack with enough troops.
JUNO Beach, for instance, was about 10 km wide. The landing force there was Canadian 3rd Division and 2nd Armored Brigade, plus attached engineers, commandos, and quartermasters: about 20,000 men. (Once the initial beach crossing was completed, quartermasters would be required to bring additional supply ashore and despatch it to troops fighting several km inland.)
Just that landing force would have filled the entire JUNO sector two ranks deep from end to end. As it was, the actual landing was confined to the western 6 km of JUNO - and the beach was jammed with men, vehicles, and gear. Much of the beach could not be used until it was cleared of landmines and obstructions, ditches were filled or bridged, and supporting tracks laid across the sand for vehicles.
Meanwhile all supplies, reinforcements, and evacuated wounded had to move through narrow channels cleared under fire by the engineers.
Thus one can see that the Allies could not send more force against a single beach than they did.
Meanwhile, the Germans, marching or driving on nice solid land, could move all troops in the area against the landing force. Tactical air power could attrit and delay these movements, but could not stop them, especially at night.
If there was only one beach, that single landing force, about division-strength (the attached units would be offset by the losses and disorder of the landing) would be fighting against several German divisions, including the beach defenders in their bunkers.
By attacking on a broader front, the Allies were able to bring more force to bear. All of the German divisions in the area were engaged at once, and so the Allies could overwhelm them, clear the beach, and have room to bring ashore additional forces.
The initial plan for NEPTUNE (the actual D-Day landing operation; OVERLORD was the entire campaign) was to land at only three beaches. Montgomery decided, very correctly, that that wasn't enough. He expanded the landings to five beaches, even though the attack had to be delayed a month to accumulate the extra landing craft.
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