> Certainly the destroyers which closed on the beach and provided the direct > fire support which facilitated the eventual breakout from the beach area > were mostly (all?) USN ships and not RN vessels.
The word is "mostly". I knew an old guy who limped at lot. I found he was machine gunned in the legs as he was firing a machine gun from the deck of his RN ship which was scraping the boom as it passed parallel to Omaha beach. They put as many machine guns on deck as possible - light hand held as well I believe. Hence why his legs were exposed.
> Thanks for the clarification on the naval forces at OMAHA, for some reason > I had it in my head that the close in destroyer support that made a key > difference to the success were RN. I'll double check, because at least one > account I have read that was a more recent study of the landings made it > clear that the destroyer attacks were key in reducing at least one of the > German positions that was situated to in such a way to provide oblique > coverage of the beach front that made it almost impossible for the > assaulting forces to clear an exit. If possible I'd like to avoid another > "Saving Private Ryan" international brouhaha.
Yes, I have a memory of that study too. Was it "Omaha Beach: A Flawed Victory" by Adrian Lewis?
I know that the British destroyers had a much shallower draught than the US ones, and they accordingly got in a lot closer.
> As to my reference to the Marines it was meant to cover several things, > first of all the Allies have taken a lot of heat (as you point out) for > not "hitting them where they ain't" so to speak. But when Montgomery and > Eisenhower chose to expand the initial COSSAC plans (and to focus the > American right flank on Cherbourg) they had limited options on where to > land the forces to ensure the most cohesive lodgment. That in turn lead to > the decision to make a daylight, frontal assault with a very limited > (compared to previous allied landings in the Mediterranean and the > Pacific) pre-landing bombardment. The Marine planners had much more > experience with that type of assault combined with naval forces and may > have been more forceful in demanding a more sustained and accurate > pre-attack pounding.
Normandy and the Pacific islands were very different on the operational level. In the Pacific, the islands were isolated from reinforcement, the attackers had numerical and technical superiority, and neither strategic not tactical surprise could not be achieved. In Normandy, on the operational level, the Allies were overwhelmingly inferior in numbers, possessed no technical advantage and relied on strategic and tactical surprise to effect a lodgement, coupled with very clever planning to win the battle of the build-up as both sides poured in reinforcements.
A prolonged bombardment might well have destroyed the beach defences (although many were built to be immune to even BB or heavy bomber fire), but it would certainly have drawn half a dozen Pz divisions to the immediate hinterland, ready to drive back and defeat any landing force.
Many US authors argue for the Marine Corp doctrine of firepower and mass in direct attack. This was a doctrine suitable for the Pacific, but one disastrous for NW Europe.
> Two, although Bradley gives much credit to the US 1st Division on OMAHA, > using that particular Division was a two edged sword, they had plenty of > experience and many of the veterans resented once again being at the front > of the assault and there is some truth to the notion that green troops, if > well lead, are more likely to be initially bold than units that have been > repeatedly exposed to combat. Given the length of the run up to Normandy, > I think the US would have had the time and resources to field a third > marine division for that purpose.
The Allies had no shortage of assault troops in June 1944; they lacked landing ships and tanks. It would have been far more valuable for the Marines in the Pacific to have given up a division-lift of assault shipping and for 21AG to go ahead with their planned sixth landing between Merville and Cabourg (to the west of Sword, on the other side of the Orne valley).
> Last, your observations about the LTV's are correct, there is no doubt > that the Sherman DD's were still the best option, but the fact does remain > that by that time in the war there were a number of proven variants of > those vehicles such as mortar and rocket launch equipped ones to have made > an impact on the beach, not only against the German forces there, but as > well as the psychological lift they would have provided the assaultng > infantry. I'm going out on a limb here, but it would also seem that they > were more well suited (at least to the initial wave) as amphibious > vehicles than the DD's.
If these variants existed, they did not exist in quantity in theatre, which is what matters. When the LVT was used in quantity in NW Europe later in 1944, it did not prove a spectacular success. The Heer was a very different animal to the IJA and IJN; it had lots of decent AT guns, for a start.
<acl...@nospamstarcott.freeserve.co.uk> wrote: > LVT *were* tested by Hobart, and proved incapable of swimming in the tidal > and wave conditions anticipated to be encountered off the Normandy beaches. > In addition, they bogged down in shingle and soft sand very easily, > especially when fully laden.
IIRC the final decision was based on lack of availability and lack of need, in the circumstances they couldn't really do much more than any of the other assault craft. Actually they swam very well in most tidal and wave conditions, including those of the Normandy beaches and were used quite extensively after the invasion for ship to shore movements. A few operated with the the Far Shore Service Groups and Ferry and Build-Up Service, but of course they were first extensively used in the Walcheren assault, where they were very useful.
> If the troops had gone in to Omaha mounted in LVT, most of them would have > drowned off-shore. The remainder would have been easy meat for anything > larger than a MG as they crawled up the beach.
Curious, you seem to be speaking with the same certainty that you berated me for with regards to the lack of range on the Crocodile flamethrower? Your statement could have as easily been "The [LVT] might have made a valuable contribution at Omaha....they may not. To say categorically that most of them would have [drowned off-shore] seems illogical." Although I actually agree with you I do have to say "pot to kettle, over"? :)
<acl...@nospamstarcott.freeserve.co.uk> wrote: > The Crocodiles might have made a valuable contribution at Omaha by closing > on the beach defences and flaming them; they may not. To say categorically > that they would *not* have been useful seems illogical.
Yes, as illogical as categorically stating that the LVT, which were later in fact used off the Normandy shores, would mostly have drowned off shore. In both cases they "might" have been useful, or they might not have been.
I tend to side with the opinion that neither would have been that useful. But in the case of the LVT there were none used in the assault, so I have little more to go on. OTOH, I do have a little more to go on, three in fact, the Crocs that were landed in the assault, but which so now use on D-Day. I can also look at the 80-120 yard range of the flame gun on the Croc, and look at the possible targets it could have been used against on OMAHA. I can also look at the incidence of the tanks that were landed bogging and being drowned out in the tide and then look at the Croc and presume that the possibility of it or its trailer getting bogged in the same circumstances, would be similar. And then look at the various anti-vehicle obstacles that would have prevented the Crocs from approaching the German defenses and conclude that, with the possible exception of WN 64 and 65, really none of the strongpoints were accessible to assault. Well, I suppose a Croc landing in front of WN 71 might have been able to get in range of the 88mm casemate guarding the antitank wall, assuming it got over the shingle and over the seawall and onto the road without the 88 knocking it out?
> A heavily-armoured tank specifically designed for the suppression of > defences is more likely to be useful during a beach assault than not, after > all.
Why yes, if it can get within range for its defense suppression weapons to be effective, without being knocked out.
<acl...@nospamstarcott.freeserve.co.uk> wrote: > Yes, I have a memory of that study too. Was it "Omaha Beach: A Flawed > Victory" by Adrian Lewis?
Yes, although a better title could have been "Omaha Beach: A Flawed Study".
> I know that the British destroyers had a much shallower draught than the US > ones, and they accordingly got in a lot closer.
The Hunt III DE that were there had a draft of 8' 3" while the US destroyers were typically 13' 5". But Talybont engaged Point du Hoc with Satterlee and neither took any part in support of the OMAHA landings. For the others:
McCook engaged mostly WN 74 and targets at Vierville, especially between 0930 and 1030, by which time she had closed to within 1,300 yards of shore between Vierville and Pointe de la Percee. Carmick also engaged targets around Vierville starting at 0810, closing to within about 900 yards of the beach. Frankford engaged targets near the Colleville exit from 0920, after being released from ASW duties in the transport area. She closed to within a reported 800 yards of the beach. Emmons engaged targets at Port-en-Bessin. Doyle assisted Emmons. Harding only fired 47 rounds. Thompson fired on the radar station at Pointe de la Percee until 1100, then moved over and fired on Les Moulins, well after the German defenses had begun to collapse. Baldwin was hit by a German battery near Port-en-Bessin at 0820 and then supported the 16th Infantry on the eastern beaches. Melbreak was a marker ship for the eastern transport area, anchoring at 0300. She fired the pre-assault bombardment and then engaged in counterbattery fire with the German batteries at Pont-en-Bessin and supported 47 Commando in its assault there. Tanatside engaged in the pre-assault bombardment, firing on targets near Saint-Laurent and reportedly was out of ammunition by 0800?
(snip agreements)
> The Allies had no shortage of assault troops in June 1944; they lacked > landing ships and tanks. It would have been far more valuable for the > Marines in the Pacific to have given up a division-lift of assault shipping > and for 21AG to go ahead with their planned sixth landing between Merville > and Cabourg (to the west of Sword, on the other side of the Orne valley).
That becomes rather a different discussion. Quite simply though, another "division-lift" of shipping simply wasn't in the offing, the extra "division-lift" that was allocated to open up SWORD and UTAH was about the best that could be done, and that was obtained mostly from new production. Re-allocating major resources from the Pacific was unlikely, since it would have required cancellation of at least some of the major operations planned there.
BTW, I think you mean to the *east* of SWORD, to the *west* of SWORD was JUNO. :) And given the terrain there I'm not sure that much would have been accomplished, although it certainly would have resulted in more "stretch" for the Germans and greater room for the Allies.
> If these variants existed, they did not exist in quantity in theatre, which > is what matters. When the LVT was used in quantity in NW Europe later in > 1944, it did not prove a spectacular success. The Heer was a very different > animal to the IJA and IJN; it had lots of decent AT guns, for a start.
Actually they were around in some quantity, at least 200 were being tested by the school wing of 79 AD. And they did good service at Walcheren and in the Rhine crossing, but those were tasks that better suited their capability than an assault landing against fefenses of the character encountered in Normandy.
On Wed, 07 Feb 2007 14:27:17 -0500, "Rich" <RichT...@msn.com> wrote: >But the issue is not the "offer" it is whether or not such an "offer" >had any utility? I could "offer" you a million dollars, but since I >don't have it, the "offer" would be somewhat moot.
I don't follow, the British did have funnies to offer. There weren't enough to fully equip all the initial waves (and that may have had some bearing on a US refusal) but I'm sure that wouldn't have stopped Churchill and/or Hobart from re-assigning a significant number to the US beaches if the US commanders had accepted an offer (or indeed requested the funnies without an offer).
On Feb 8, 1:52 pm, "Rich" <RichT...@msn.com> wrote:
> On Feb 8, 11:21 am, "Andrew Clark" > BTW, I think you mean to the *east* of SWORD, to the *west* of SWORD > was JUNO. :) And given the terrain there I'm not sure that much would > have been accomplished, although it certainly would have resulted in > more "stretch" for the Germans and greater room for the Allies.
I believe that this was to have been BAND Beach, but haven't been able to find out much info on the aborted planning on who and how much was to land there
>> The Heer was a very different > > animal to the IJA and IJN; it had lots of decent AT guns, for a start.
But what was there in the IJNshore batteries was Naval Cannon, 3 inch, 4.7inch, and 6 Inch that had both shot and shell, though am unsure if their IJA75mmAAA had Shot, but theIJN 25mm did. The older Cannon were mostly Elswick or Vickers in origin, though old, would not be troubled by even Churchill levels of armor(excepting the 3") so it doesn't really matter for thinner skinned types hitting the beach
On Feb 8, 1:59 pm, "Rich" <RichT...@msn.com> wrote:
> On Feb 8, 5:47 am, "Andrew Clark"
> <acl...@nospamstarcott.freeserve.co.uk> wrote: > > The Crocodiles might have made a valuable contribution at Omaha by closing > > on the beach defences and flaming them; they may not. To say categorically > > that they would *not* have been useful seems illogical.
> Yes, as illogical as categorically stating that the LVT, which were > later in fact used off the Normandy shores, would mostly have drowned > off shore. In both cases they "might" have been useful, or they might > not have been.
> I tend to side with the opinion that neither would have been that > useful.
I agree. I was in the USMC in the early 1970s when they finally stopped using flame tanks. I was stationed in the same area as a tank battalion and knew many tankers. Unlike a gun tank, a flame tank has limited upward traverse and was not capable of taking out anything that was situated much higher than the tank. All the pictures of Omaha that I've seen have the German defenses quite a bit higher than the beach.
> By the end of D-Day, US forces > at OMAHA had not penetrated "inland" to their objectives, but they had > penetrated "inland" on average between about 1,500 and 2,000 yards. On > the Commonwealth beaches penetration "inland" had also occurred, but > also - except partly the 2nd Canadian Division - the objectives had > not been achieved. On average the penetration inland had been greater, > but also on average the resistance and obstacles had been somewhat > less.
The resistance and obstacles at Gold, Juno and Sword cannot be said to be less than at Omaha. That is something of a face-saving American myth which I am sorry to see you perpetuate.
BCE forces had penetrated some *miles* inland by the end of D-Day; US forces had penetrated some *yards* inland from Omaha. No force reached their objectives, but BCE forces got a great deal further toward achieving their objectives than US forces at Omaha.
> IIRC the final decision was based on lack of availability and lack of > need, in the circumstances they couldn't really do much more than any > of the other assault craft. Actually they swam very well in most tidal > and wave conditions, including those of the Normandy beaches and were > used quite extensively after the invasion for ship to shore movements. > A few operated with the Far Shore Service Groups and Ferry and > Build-Up Service, but of course they were first extensively used in > the Walcheren assault, where they were very useful.
The LVT was used post-D-day off the Normandy beaches in shallow waters only; they were incapable of overcoming the rip and other higher-velocity tidal flows found further off-shore. Given that they would have to have been released into this distant region to swim into the landing beaches, Hobart concluded that the LVT was not an appropriate vehicle for the beach assault phase, as it ran a very high risk of not getting to the beach at all. Added to that were its vulnerability to AT weapons and even heavy MG fire and its poor shingle mobility, a combination calculated to present the German troops with ideal targets...
At Walcheren, the LVT was not used in strong tidal conditions or in the assault phase (those troops were mounted in landing craft and DD tanks), but as a very useful amphibious troop-carrier for the follow-up troops.
> Curious, you seem to be speaking with the same certainty that you > berated me for with regards to the lack of range on the Crocodile > flamethrower?
Well, I have some solid empirical evidence about the LVT's capabilities, whereas you seem to have forgotten the Churchill Crocodile's gun, machine guns and armour in order to make your point...
> Your statement could have as easily been "The [LVT] > might have made a valuable contribution at Omaha....they may not. To > say categorically that most of them would have [drowned off-shore] > seems illogical."
The facts are different in the two cases, though. The issue is not about tactical uncertainties in battle, but a known and documented mechanical incapacity.
<acl...@nospamstarcott.freeserve.co.uk> wrote: > The resistance and obstacles at Gold, Juno and Sword cannot be said to be > less than at Omaha. That is something of a face-saving American myth which I > am sorry to see you perpetuate.
Do we really have to go into this subject again Andrew? Or do I have to clip some of the dozens of bits of evidence I have posted here over the years to demonstarte that both of those sentences are nonesense?
1). The resistance and obstacles at Gold, Juno and Sword cannot be said to be less than at Omaha.
False. In fact the resistance and obstacles at GOLD, JUNO and SWORD were _much_ less than at OMAHA, both in quantity and quality. The folowing partial analysis I have written derives in part from some past conversations where you attempted to perpetuate your own mythos; as in this case making statements you purport to be "fact" when you have presented no evidence to show that they are anything but your own unsubstantiated opinion.
GOLD Area was assaulted in Sector JIG, with Beaches Green West and Green East assaulted by 1st Hamps and 1st Dorsets and Sector KING, Beaches Green and Red assaulted by 6 Green Howards and 5 E Yorks. A total of four battalions were in the assault echelon, supported by 47 Royal Marine Commando.
JUNO Area was assaulted in Sector MIKE, Beach Green and Sector NAN, Beaches Green, White and Red. Again a total of four battalions were in the assault echelon and 48 Royal Marine Commando supported them.
SWORD Area was assaulted in QUEEN Sector, Beaches White and Red with two battalions, 1 S Lancs and 2 E Yorks, in the assault echelon and with 4 and 41 Commando in support.
In all a total of about ten infantry battalions and four Commandos made up the assault waves on the Commonwealth beaches.
OMAHA Area was assaulted in DOG Sector, Beaches Green, White and Red, EASY Sector, Beaches Green and Red, and FOX Sector, Beach Green. Five battalions (of the 16th and 116th Infantry, a sixth, the 1st Battalion, 16th Infantry was the assault echelon reserve) were in the assault echelon. They were supported by the 5th Ranger Battalion and (as it turned out) about two-thirds of the 2nd Ranger Battalion.
UTAH Area was assaulted in TARE Sector, Beach Green and UNCLE Sector, Beach Red. Two battalions (of the 8th Infantry) were in the assault echelon.
Thus, a total of about seven/eight infantry and one and two-thirds Ranger battalions made up the assault waves on the American beaches.
Now, how strongly defended were the beaches? Well we have pretty accurate counts of the fixed defenses. They were as follows:
SWORD - 3 75mm, 3 50mm, 1 37mm, 7 mortars (80mm and 50mm), 14 MG JUNO - 1 88mm, 2 75mm, 6 50mm, 5 mortars, 33 MG, 20 4-barrel 320mm Wurfrahmen (never fired because the control cables were cut by the bombardment)
If we look at GOLB beach, which was arguably the most contested of the Commonwealth beaches, we find that it encompassed a front from slightly west of La Hamel to Grey-sur-Mere, a distance of about 6.5 kilometers. Along that frontage were ten Wiederstandsneste (resistance nests) numbered from east-to-west WN 32, 33, 34, 35, 35a, 35b, 36, 37, 38, and 39. Of those, a total of four could observe and bring direct fire on GOLD JIG and GOLD KING. Those were WN 33, 35, 36, and 37 (WN 38 with another two 7.5cm FK had a limited field of fire partly covering the western edge of WN 37, but it and WN 39 were primarily designed to defend the seaward and eastern landward approaches to Arromanches). Between them they were armed with one 8.8cm Pak, two 7.5cm FK (f), five 5cm Pak, one 3.7cm Pak, two mortars (apparently both 5cm), and 18 machineguns. There were six positions backing them up. Those included three artillery batteries:
3/HKA 1260 at WN 35a (the Mont Fleury Battery) with four 12.2cm K390 (r), 5/AR 1716 at WN 35b (the Crepon Battery) with four 10cm leFH 14/19 (t), 6/AR 1716 at WN 32 (the Mare Fontaine Battery) also with four 10cm leFH 14/19 (t), and a minor backup position at WN 34 with a single 5cm gun.
WN 38 and 39 were the strongest positions, mounting two 7.5cm FK (f), two 5cm Pak and one 5cm mortar, with perhaps as many as eight machineguns. Most of the non-artillery positions included one or two casemates and three or more 'Tobruck' mounts for machineguns.
A great weakness to the position was the lack of reliable infantry to defend it. Located with the artillery at WN 35b was a headquarters unit, Stab/Ost Btl 441. This battalion also had four infantry companies. 1/Ost Btl 441, based at Vaux north of Bayeux, was well out of the GOLD sector and played no part in the days events. 2/Ost Btl 441, based at Reviers, was also not involved against GOLD and spent the day fighting the Canadians at JUNO. 3/Ost Btl 441 based at Meuvaines, made up the garrison of WN 33, 34 and 35, "stiffened" by 7/ Gren Rgt 726 (see below). Elements drawn from a platoon of 7/Gren Rgt 736 occupied field fortifications in Graye-sur-Mer (the bulk of the company was at WN 31 at La Riviere, also facing the Canadian landings on JUNO). 4/Ost Btl 441 occupied field fortifications along the low ridge in front of Ver-sur-Mer.
The second infantry element defending in the GOLD sector was II./Gren.- Regt. 726. The battalion Stab and 7. Kompanie was at Sainte-Croix-sur- Mer, with 7. Kompanie providing "stiffening" at WN 33, 34 and 35. 6./ Gren.-Regt. 726, based at Bazenville, occupied WN 36 and 38. 5. and 8. Kompanie formed a reserve at Creully about five kilometers inland. Finally, Gren.-Regt. 916. of 352. Infanterie-Division was present in the form of a single company occupying WN 37 (La Hamel), 38 and 39. The rest of this battalion was deployed to the west between Arromanches and La Hamel (the regimental and divisional boundary ran through La Hamel (inclusive to Gren.-Regt. 916. and 352. Inf.-Div.) and Bazenville (inclusive to Gren.-Regt. 726. and 716 Inf.-Div.)
The actual defenders of the positions "on the beach" (WN 33, 35, 36, and 37) consisted of 6. and 7./Gren.-Regt. 726., 3./Ost-Btl. 441., a platoon of 7./ Gren.-Regt. 736., and a platoon of II./Gren.-Regt. 916. Thus a total of three and two-third companies of infantry. Another three and two-third infantry companies, three artillery batteries, and two battalion headquarters companies supported them. All told these may have amounted to about 1,600 men.
OMAHA Beach encompassed a front from slightly west of Ste Honorine des Pertes to slightly east of Pointe et Raz de la Percee, a distance of about seven kilometers. Along the frontage were 14 Wiederstandsneste, WN 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, and 73. Of those all except three, WN 63, 67 and 69 could engage targets on the beach with direct fire. Those positions included a wide array of firepower. Weapons included two 8.8cm Pak, one 7.62cm FK (r), six 7.5cm FK (f), two 7.5cm turreted guns (taken from the VK3001 tank prototype), ten 5cm Pak, one 4.7cm Pak, six 3.7cm guns (mostly turreted), 17 mortars (at least two 8cm), 85 machineguns, and 38 4- barrel 320mm Wurfrahmen (some, but not all, were apparently fired). Four artillery batteries from I. and IV./Art.-Regt. 352. (five if Pointe du Hoc were included) backed the position up with a total of 12 10.5cm leFH and four 15cm sFH.
Infantry defense initially comprised 3./Gren.-Regt. 726. based at Colleville-sur-Mer occupying WN 60, 61, and 62, 10./Gren.-Regt.726. occupying WN 64, 65, 66, and 68, and 11./Gren.-Regt. 726. based at Vierville occupying WN 70, 71, 72, and 73. Stab I./Gren.-Regt. 726. was at Maisons, Stab III. was at Chateau du Jucoville and Stab II./ Gren.-Regt. 916. was at Formigny. 5./Gren.-Regt. based at St Laurent- sur-Mer and 8./Gren.-Regt. 916. based at Colleville-sur-Mer "stiffened" 3., 10. and 11./Gren.-Regt. 726.
In addition immediate reserves included 1./Gren.-Regt. 726. at Port en Bessin, 2./Gren.-Regt. 726. at St Honorine, 9./Gren.-Regt. 726. at Château Englesqueville, 6./Gren.-Regt. 916. at Formigny, and 7./Gren.- Regt. 916. at Surrain. Thus a total of five infantry companies' occupied positions "on the beach" supported by another five infantry companies and four artillery batteries.
Prepared obstacles were measured by yard as:
SWORD - 0.30 obstacles per yard, average weight 217 lbs. each JUNO - 0.47 obstacles per yard, average weight 340 lbs. each GOLD - 0.43 obstacles per yard, average weight 394 lbs. each OMAHA - 0.49 obstacles per yard, average weight 401 lbs. each UTAH - 0.41 obstacles per yard, average weight 250 lbs. each
(The reason that OMAHA and GOLD obstacles were so 'heavy' on average was because more use was made of Element C on those beaches -- there was none employed on UTAH for instance.)
Resistance may also be - somewhat subjectively - measured in terms of casualties. Here again we find that on the most contested Commonwealth beach, GOLD, casualties were about 481 as opposed to the approximately 2,700 incurred at OMAHA.
You may also note that none of the Commonwealth beaches were confronted with the natural obstacle presented by the bluffs at OMAHA and that none of the German possitions on those beaches had the dominance of those at OMAHA. As just one example, notice that at GOLD of the 10 Wiederstandesneste present, only four could actually bring direct fire onto either of the British landing sites. On OMAHA, of 14, all but three could fire directly onto the landing sites, and at least four could fire onto the entire length of the beach.
2). That is something of a face-saving American myth which I am sorry to see you perpetuate.
False. First you need to demonstrate that there is any requirement for "face saving" by either the American or Commonwealth forces with regards to NEPTUNE. I don't happen to see that there is, since they accomplished their primary mission succesfully all along the front. Second you need to establish that a "myth" exists, for which see (1), above. There is no myth, so no need for "face-saving."
<acl...@nospamstarcott.freeserve.co.uk> wrote: > The LVT was used post-D-day off the Normandy beaches in shallow waters only; > they were incapable of overcoming the rip and other higher-velocity tidal > flows found further off-shore. Given that they would have to have been > released into this distant region to swim into the landing beaches, Hobart > concluded that the LVT was not an appropriate vehicle for the beach assault > phase, as it ran a very high risk of not getting to the beach at all. Added > to that were its vulnerability to AT weapons and even heavy MG fire and its > poor shingle mobility, a combination calculated to present the German troops > with ideal targets...
It would be nice if you would give a reference of some sort for these assertions, since I have never heard them before? It is somewhat surprising given the frequency of their use in the completely unprotected waters of the Pacific assaults, but I'll withhold judgement for now assuming you can back these statements up. I certainly haven't found anything to that effect in WO 205.1159 "79th Armoured Division Final Report" or in WO 205/1160 "1st Assault Brigade, RE" which in fact makes glowing mention of their Buffaloes.
> At Walcheren, the LVT was not used in strong tidal conditions or in the > assault phase (those troops were mounted in landing craft and DD tanks), but > as a very useful amphibious troop-carrier for the follow-up troops.
Sorry, but that is utter nonesense and I suspect you know it. Or perhaps you don't? From WO 205/1160 the operation may be summarized as:
:The plan was to launch an attack from two points. The 4th Commando was to be landed at Flushing from Naval LCAs operating from Breskens. They were to be followed up by 155 Infantry Brigade, transported across the Scheldt and maintained by 20 Buffaloes of 11 Royal Tank Regiment. Almost simultaneously with this attack the main assault by the 4th Special Service Brigade (Commandos) was to be launched against Westkapelle. This was a combined operation in every sense. The Commandos were to be landed in 104 Buffaloes of 5 Assault Regiment and 82 Squadron, which were to be transported to the beaches from Ostend in Landing Craft Tank manned by the Royal Navy. In addition, a troop of AVREs from 87 Squadron under Capt. Ritchie, MC, RE, a Troop of Flails and Sherman gun tanks, and four armoured bulldozers of 149 Assault Park Squadron, were to land as assault teams."
The two main assaults were comprised of LVT and LCA carried infantry respectively, there were no DDs that I am aware of.
> Well, I have some solid empirical evidence about the LVT's capabilities, > whereas you seem to have forgotten the Churchill Crocodile's gun, machine > guns and armour in order to make your point...
No, you have done nothing of the sort. You have presented an unsubstatiated opinion of their incapability and given the lack of accuracy in your description of the Walcheren assault I think I'm justified in asking you to back up your claim with some references.
> The facts are different in the two cases, though. The issue is not about > tactical uncertainties in battle, but a known and documented mechanical > incapacity.
Yes and for the Crocodile it is its "known and documented" restricted range of 80-100 yards, its limitations in engaging targets at higher elevations, and the restricted mobility of its fuel trailer.
> The LVT was used post-D-day off the Normandy beaches in shallow waters > only; they were incapable of overcoming the rip and other higher-velocity > tidal flows found further off-shore. Given that they would have to have > been released into this distant region to swim into the landing beaches, > Hobart concluded that the LVT was not an appropriate vehicle for the beach > assault phase, as it ran a very high risk of not getting to the beach at > all. Added to that were its vulnerability to AT weapons and even heavy MG > fire and its poor shingle mobility, a combination calculated to present > the German troops with ideal targets...
So,
basically what you are saying is the same forces that sank Hobart's DD's would have sunk LVT's...got it.
> Yes, as illogical as categorically stating that the LVT, which were > later in fact used off the Normandy shores, would mostly have drowned > off shore. In both cases they "might" have been useful, or they might > not have been. > I tend to side with the opinion that neither would have been that > useful. But in the case of the LVT there were none used in the > assault, so I have little more to go on.
I'll answer LVT issues in the original sub-thread...
> OTOH, I do have a little more > to go on, three in fact, the Crocs that were landed in the assault, > but which so now use on D-Day. I can also look at the 80-120 yard > range of the flame gun on the Croc, and look at the possible targets > it could have been used against on OMAHA. I can also look at the > incidence of the tanks that were landed bogging and being drowned out > in the tide and then look at the Croc and presume that the possibility > of it or its trailer getting bogged in the same circumstances, would > be similar. And then look at the various anti-vehicle obstacles that > would have prevented the Crocs from approaching the German defenses > and conclude that, with the possible exception of WN 64 and 65, really > none of the strongpoints were accessible to assault. Well, I suppose a > Croc landing in front of WN 71 might have been able to get in range of > the 88mm casemate guarding the antitank wall, assuming it got over the > shingle and over the seawall and onto the road without the 88 knocking > it out?
All this assumes that the battle went as historically with the addition of some flame tanks parachuted among the historical scale of attackers and defenders.
But the Churchill Crocodile was a heavily armoured gun-tank as well as a flame-tank. If its superior armour had enabled it to survive long enough to use its 75mm gun against the strongpoints (as indeed happened on the BCE beaches), then the combat engineers would have had a better environment in which to work and thus may have been able to clear the mines and anti-vehicle obstacles preventing the close approach of tanks to the pillboxes. And then the flame would have had utility.
And the flame had utility against other targets too; in fact using it to set fire to things would have created very useful smoke cover - similar smoke played an important role in helping troops advance off the beach on one sub-section of Omaha.
In short, putting specialist assault armour onto an assault beach is always more likely than not to improve the chances of a successful assault - as shown by the simple fact that on those heavily-defended beaches where it was used, large inland penetrations were made, whereas on the one it wasn't used, the troops barely got off the beach. Isn't that at all significant?
> Why yes, if it can get within range for its defense suppression > weapons to be effective, without being knocked out.
The Churchill Crocodile was a heavily armoured gun-tank as well as a flame-tank, just as the AVRE was a heavily-armoured MG platform (used to splendid effect on Gold) as well as a petard-mortar carrier.
<acl...@nospamstarcott.freeserve.co.uk> wrote: > I'll answer LVT issues in the original sub-thread...
Oh yes, please do. :)
> All this assumes that the battle went as historically with the addition of > some flame tanks parachuted among the historical scale of attackers and > defenders.
By "all this" do you mean the following paragraph? Since I would assume that the battle did actually "went as historically"? But "parachuted"? Frankly you have me somewhat confused.
> But the Churchill Crocodile was a heavily armoured gun-tank as well as a > flame-tank. If its superior armour had enabled it to survive long enough to > use its 75mm gun against the strongpoints (as indeed happened on the BCE > beaches), then the combat engineers would have had a better environment in > which to work and thus may have been able to clear the mines and > anti-vehicle obstacles preventing the close approach of tanks to the > pillboxes. And then the flame would have had utility.
Er, sorry, but no Crocodile, which were Churchill Mark VII equipped with the flame projector, were operationally used on D-Day and only three were landed. None were in the assault waves, all three landed with the reserve follow-up waves. So there cannot be any "as indeed happened on the BCE beaches." And if you are referring to the AVRE, they were all based on Mark III and IV conversions, so had only 4-inch verticle armor rather than than the 6-inch of the Mark VII, so were nearly as vulnerable practically as the M4.
Further, the record shows that the AVRE were not used as you describe on the "BCE beaches" and that where they did encounter well-emplaced antitank defenses as were found at OMAHA they cam off rather the worse for it.
> And the flame had utility against other targets too; in fact using it to set > fire to things would have created very useful smoke cover - similar smoke > played an important role in helping troops advance off the beach on one > sub-section of Omaha.
I'm not sure how I would feel as an infantry section commander if I was "supported" by a Croc setting a hillside alight so that I could advance under the smoke produced? I think you are going for a bit of a stretch at this point.
> In short, putting specialist assault armour onto an assault beach is always > more likely than not to improve the chances of a successful assault - as > shown by the simple fact that on those heavily-defended beaches where it was > used, large inland penetrations were made, whereas on the one it wasn't > used, the troops barely got off the beach. Isn't that at all significant?
A rather amusing use of Occam's razor that. I could as easily declare that it was due to the LCA (H), were also weren't at OMAHA, or the even more likely and even simpler reason that they weren't as heavily defended, which I can demonstrate as easily for JUNO and SWORD as I did for GOLD.
> The Churchill Crocodile was a heavily armoured gun-tank as well as a > flame-tank, just as the AVRE was a heavily-armoured MG platform (used to > splendid effect on Gold) as well as a petard-mortar carrier.
I see, so the example of the _single_ AVRE that successfully got off the beach at JIG GREEN and supported the attack on Le Hamel is your "proof"? So ignoring the other 40 that did not do so? And ignoring the 8 lost (1 to the 75mm at Le Hamel and 1 to the 88mm at La Riviere, with 5 drowned and 1 overturned on a fascine) and 2 damaged to gunfire?
And again, the AVRE was not nearly as "heavily-armoured" as you seem to believe and could be defeated from the front by both the German 75mm and 88mm pieces in use on the beach at the ranges encountered.
> It appears incredible that, given these circumstances, any realistic > "offer" of AVRE for use on the American beaches could ever have been > made. And yet the claim that such an "offer" was made and > "refused" (usually General Omar Bradley is the scapegoat) appears time > after time.
By your own account, 180 AVRE were available by D-Day and more were deployed than envisaged in the plan. It would seem perfectly realistic for some (two-fifths would be 72) to have been offered to the US and refused. 72 AVRE, 36 per US beach, would certainly be better than nothing, even if far less than the idea aimed for by Hobart. After all, 36 AVRE (assuming LCT were available) would be an 18% increase in planned armoured support on Omaha beach, and (given that none of them would drown) perhaps a 37% increase in armoured fighting strength on the beach. And that doesn't take into account qualitative issues.
All your calculations prove is that the British could only offer a small contribution of AVRE to the US, not that they could not offer any or could not make a 'realistic' offer. You have certainly proven that the British could not offer a second assault regiment as conceived by Hobart, but that isn't the same thing at all.
> Of course I haven't been able to find the memo/document that > corroborates either version, which is why all this remains a draft > right now. :)
It strikes me that you have got a very long way toward forming your conclusion (and writing your book) in the absence of anything other than circumstantial evidence. Basically, you are now looking to confirm your supposition, not research the case.
> Er, with respect, don't try to teach you grandmother to suck eggs? :) > BTW, WO 219 and 229 are mostly microfilmed copies of SHAEF documents, > I have the originals in my backyard (well, 30 miles away). :)
But, according to my source at PRO, the British series have significant additional documents to the US NA series. But what do I know?
<acl...@nospamstarcott.freeserve.co.uk> wrote: > By your own account, 180 AVRE were available by D-Day and more were deployed > than envisaged in the plan. It would seem perfectly realistic for some > (two-fifths would be 72) to have been offered to the US and refused. 72 > AVRE, 36 per US beach, would certainly be better than nothing, even if far > less than the idea aimed for by Hobart. After all, 36 AVRE (assuming LCT > were available) would be an 18% increase in planned armoured support on > Omaha beach, and (given that none of them would drown) perhaps a 37% > increase in armoured fighting strength on the beach. And that doesn't take > into account qualitative issues.
Well, they could only really know that by about the middle of May. So such an offer could hardly have been made in January. The equipment conversions and units themselves only became available as organized operational formations beginning in mid-April. Add in the complication of uncertain landing craft availability (mostly due to low serviceability rates only solved at the last moment as well) and it becomes that much more unlikely.
But of course we could assume a redistribution based upon the number actually available by about mid May when the assault plans were "locked in". But an even distribution of the 180 would have been 22.5 per assault sector, so 67.5 for the three assault beaches for the US and 112.5 for the five assault beaches for the British (we can fight over the half AVRE later :) ). So roughly 44 each for OMAHA, JUNO and GOLD, and 22 each for UTAH and SWORD. So a possible major effect on Commonwealth assault planning, a redistribution of 24-odd LCT to the Western Naval Task Force, the integration of them into the existing US assault plan and so on.
And having the addtional armored vehicles on OMAHA would have been good, but it seems unlikley that it would have made much of a difference if they were AVRE or M4. Nor do I understand why you assume that it is "given that none of them would drown"? The AVRE were drowned out in the surf in large numbers, as were many other vehicles, they had no real advantage there.
> All your calculations prove is that the British could only offer a small > contribution of AVRE to the US, not that they could not offer any or could > not make a 'realistic' offer. You have certainly proven that the British > could not offer a second assault regiment as conceived by Hobart, but that > isn't the same thing at all.
Actually, it would have been a third assault regiment, the bulk of two were actually deployed, 5th and 6th Assault Regiment RE, on the Commonwealth beaches. :)
And my "calculations" don't prove anything, they simply demonstrate some of the problems and realities the planners were working with, that are all typically airily dismissed with the overly succinct summary that "the Yanks refused the offer." But the "calculations" - the planning factors they had to work with - were much more complex than that.
> It strikes me that you have got a very long way toward forming your > conclusion (and writing your book) in the absence of anything other than > circumstantial evidence. Basically, you are now looking to confirm your > supposition, not research the case.
Certainly, so I have formed a hypothesis, not a conclusion and I'm going through the testing stage of it now. But in this type of science it is additonal research and evidence that will prove or disprove the hypothesis and result in a new synthesis, along with peer discussions like this. So what I am "looking" at is more research - it never seems to end and there never seems to be enough time in the day for it. And this is just one chapter in my working draft, it's not the whole book. :)
> But, according to my source at PRO, the British series have significant > additional documents to the US NA series. But what do I know?
That would be unusual, since the review I did of them in October- November 2004 at my time-before-last at Kew indicated otherwise. They are the same documents and indeed the same file organization that may be found in RG331, Allied Operational and Occupation HQ, World War II, SHAEF. Indeed, the SHAEF records at NARA include duplicate hardcopy and microfilm copies of many of the 21 Army Group reports as well, which should be expected since at the end of the war the documents were shared, with the primary documents typically going in hardcopy to the promulgating nation with microfilm copies going to the other. So I would be curious what TNA (it's not the PRO anymore you know :) ) has that NARA doesn't?
Although I do know what Kew does _have_, which is a well-organized, functional, highly-efficient, and user-friendly operation. I try to take every possible opportunity to use TNA/PRO and not just because London is about my favorite city in the world. I've found over the years that time spent on research in Kew is about three to four times as productive as that spent in Suitland - but in this case it was hard to use a digital camera to copy from a microfilm image, so I've spent most of that effort in RG 331.
> By "all this" do you mean the following paragraph? Since I would > assume that the battle did actually "went as historically"? But > "parachuted"? Frankly you have me somewhat confused.
By 'parachuted', I meant 'arbitrarily inserted without reference to context', rather than falling to earth on a big white silk sheet.
My sentence might better have read: "Your account of the likely outcome of the battle for Omaha beach if Crocodiles had been employed does not take account of the wider ramifications of the presence of heavily-armoured gun tanks on the beach, but is simply a narrative of the historical battle with the arbitrary insertion of Crocodiles without reference to those wider ramifications".
> Er, sorry, but no Crocodile, which were Churchill Mark VII equipped > with the flame projector, were operationally used on D-Day and only > three were landed. None were in the assault waves, all three landed > with the reserve follow-up waves. So there cannot be any "as indeed > happened on the BCE beaches."
Sorry, but you are wrong, according to the Tank Museum which has the 141 Regiment RAC documents. The six (not three) Crocodiles landed on D-Day did indeed see action *as gun tanks* on 6 June, which is precisely what I said. The only reason why they did not use their flamethrowers until early on 7 June (not, incidentally, 8 June as I believe you have said previously), was because by the time the two troops landed, there were no fortified positions left to assault in their immediate areas, due to the success of the initial assault waves.
I'm afraid that your argument here thus has no foundation. The facts support my original claim that, as a heavily armoured gun-tank as well as a flame-tank, the Crocodile's superior armour might well have enabled it to survive long enough to use its 75mm gun against the strongpoints so that the combat engineers would have had a better environment in which to work and thus may have been able to clear the mines and anti-vehicle obstacles preventing the close approach of tanks to the pillboxes. And then the flame would have had utility.
Of course, a mix of gun, flame, and armoured engineering vehicles would have served even better...
> And if you are referring to the AVRE, > they were all based on Mark III and IV conversions, so had only 4-inch > verticle armor rather than than the 6-inch of the Mark VII, so were > nearly as vulnerable practically as the M4.
At least some and perhaps all of the Mk 3/4 chassis AVRE Petard tanks used on D-Day had an armour upgrade to Mk 7 standards - 20mm appliqué armour to the sides, glacis increased to 2 1/4 inches and a new visor (Tank Museum). This was done to avoid the obvious flaw of up-grading the old 6-pounder Mk 3/4/5 while ignoring the rather more pressing needs of the AVRE. AFAIK, this upgrade was not carried out on the engineering vehicle variants of the AVRE - the Ark and Bobbin so on.
This meant that the AVRE Petards had the same frontal armour as the Crocodile (also a Mk 7) - 152mm.
> Further, the record shows that the AVRE were not used as you describe > on the "BCE beaches" and that where they did encounter well-emplaced > antitank defenses as were found at OMAHA they cam off rather the worse > for it.
I have never claimed that the AVRE was a wonder weapon. It was a specialised engineering vehicle, intended to be used alongside other armoured vehicles as part of infantry-armour tactical assault task forces. To properly assess the utility of the AVRE, one must look not exclusively at the tank itself but also at the success of the task forces which included it. You have done the former, but not the latter.
> I'm not sure how I would feel as an infantry section commander if I > was "supported" by a Croc setting a hillside alight so that I could > advance under the smoke produced? I think you are going for a bit of a > stretch at this point.
116th RCT on Omaha were helped to advance off the beach precisely *because* they had cover from smoke from burning grasses accidentally set alight by gunfire. In later 21 AG attacks, Crocodiles (and Wasps) were frequently used to set fires to generate local smoke cover.
My original comment doesn't seem like any sort of stretch, actually.
> A rather amusing use of Occam's razor that. I could as easily declare > that it was due to the LCA (H), were also weren't at OMAHA, or the > even more likely and even simpler reason that they weren't as heavily > defended, which I can demonstrate as easily for JUNO and SWORD as I > did for GOLD.
Why not actually address my point rather than attempt to avoid it?
Is putting specialist assault armour - as part of all-arms tactical task groups - onto a heavily defended beach more likely than not to improve the chances of a successful assault?
> I see, so the example of the _single_ AVRE that successfully got off > the beach at JIG GREEN and supported the attack on Le Hamel is your > "proof"? So ignoring the other 40 that did not do so? And ignoring the > 8 lost (1 to the 75mm at Le Hamel and 1 to the 88mm at La Riviere, > with 5 drowned and 1 overturned on a fascine) and 2 damaged to > gunfire?
You have again ignored my argument. I said: that "the AVRE was a heavily-armoured MG platform (used to splendid effect on Gold...". That is perfectly true. In fact, I could have pointed out the textbook employment of the AVRE Petards of 81 Sqn 6 Assault Regt at Hable de Heurtot (west of la Rivière), where several pillboxes were knocked out and the fortification stormed - precisely the sort of infantry-armour tactical assault envisaged by Hobart and the 21 AG planners.
What you have done is highlight a single battle on a single beach sub-sector in which the AVRE was not successful - failing to point out that, as is well known, the absence of the planned DD gun tanks on Jig Green exposed the AVREs and Flails to unsuppressed fire from the gigantic Le Hamel defensive complex, which is why so many of them were knocked out. This is not the way to properly assess the worth of the AVRE; indeed it seems to amount to a rather academically disreputable attempt to smear it rather than any worthwhile analysis.
> And again, the AVRE was not nearly as "heavily-armoured" as you seem > to believe and could be defeated from the front by both the German > 75mm and 88mm pieces in use on the beach at the ranges encountered.
> It would be nice if you would give a reference of some sort for these > assertions, since I have never heard them before? It is somewhat > surprising given the frequency of their use in the completely > unprotected waters of the Pacific assaults, but I'll withhold > judgement for now assuming you can back these statements up. I > certainly haven't found anything to that effect in WO 205.1159 "79th > Armoured Division Final Report" or in WO 205/1160 "1st Assault > Brigade, RE" which in fact makes glowing mention of their Buffaloes.
There is a copy of Hobart's report attached to the Chiefs of Staff's paper about LVTs (LVT for 21 Army Group") within CAB 79/30/8.
> Sorry, but that is utter nonesense and I suspect you know it. Or > perhaps you don't? From WO 205/1160 the operation may be summarized > as:
> :The plan was to launch an attack from two points. The 4th Commando > was to be landed at Flushing from Naval LCAs operating from Breskens. > They were to be followed up by 155 Infantry Brigade, transported > across the Scheldt and maintained by 20 Buffaloes of 11 Royal Tank > Regiment. Almost simultaneously with this attack the main assault by > the 4th Special Service Brigade (Commandos) was to be launched against > Westkapelle. This was a combined operation in every sense. The > Commandos were to be landed in 104 Buffaloes of 5 Assault Regiment and > 82 Squadron, which were to be transported to the beaches from Ostend > in Landing Craft Tank manned by the Royal Navy. In addition, a troop > of AVREs from 87 Squadron under Capt. Ritchie, MC, RE, a Troop of > Flails and Sherman gun tanks, and four armoured bulldozers of 149 > Assault Park Squadron, were to land as assault teams."
> The two main assaults were comprised of LVT and LCA carried infantry > respectively, there were no DDs that I am aware of.
I certainly have a memory of reading about DD tanks being employed at Westkapelle, but it may have been Shermans equipped for deep wading instead, or I may have been thinking of Op Vitality, where they certainly were used. It's a subsidiary point anyway.
As far as the LVT is concerned, you will note that your own reference perfectly confirms my point. I said "At Walcheren, the LVT was not used in strong tidal conditions or in the assault phase (those troops were mounted in landing craft and DD tanks), but as a very useful amphibious troop-carrier for the follow-up troops".
You said that 4th Commando at Flushing (the assault wave) were landed by LCA; it was the *follow-up wave* of 155 Infantry Brigade that used LVT. This is because the LVT was not regarded as a capable assault vehicle; once the defences had been breached, the LVT ferried the follow-up troops across the relatively protected waters of the Scheldt. Note too that when 155 IB assaulted W3 and W4 on D+1, they were required to disembark from their LVT *before* the final approach, as the LVT were regarded as "far too vulnerable" to be used in close action against fixed defences.
You also said that 4th SS Brigade landed at Westkapelle in LVT *transported in LCT*. This is true, but is not the whole story. The initial assault wave at Westkapelle landed in LCA; the follow-up waves then landed from LVT. Again, the LVT was not used as an assault vehicle. Also, neither was the LVT exposed to the open sea conditions off Westkapelle; they were transported to the scene in LCT, in contrast to the Flushing operation where the river conditions were easier.
The use of the LVT at Walcheren thus confirms my original point was that the LVT "proved incapable of swimming in the tidal and wave conditions anticipated to be encountered off the Normandy beaches".
Incidentally, although the LVT was used off the Normandy beaches after the assault, it was only used for close-range ferrying.
> No, you have done nothing of the sort. You have presented an > unsubstatiated opinion of their incapability and given the lack of > accuracy in your description of the Walcheren assault I think I'm > justified in asking you to back up your claim with some references.
Oh dear. Apart from a mistake of memory about DD tanks, it turns out I was completely right...
> Yes and for the Crocodile it is its "known and documented" restricted > range of 80-100 yards, its limitations in engaging targets at higher > elevations, and the restricted mobility of its fuel trailer.
The point I made about the Crocodile was rather more sophisticated than this, but let's leave that for the original thread.
<acl...@nospamstarcott.freeserve.co.uk> wrote: > By 'parachuted', I meant 'arbitrarily inserted without reference to > context', rather than falling to earth on a big white silk sheet.
I was hoping that was what you meant, otherwise I was going to advise you to consult with the men in the big white coats....from Bedlam. :)
> My sentence might better have read: "Your account of the likely outcome of > the battle for Omaha beach if Crocodiles had been employed does not take > account of the wider ramifications of the presence of heavily-armoured gun > tanks on the beach, but is simply a narrative of the historical battle with > the arbitrary insertion of Crocodiles without reference to those wider > ramifications".
Well, on OMAHA one of the "wider ramifications" was that the terrain and nature of the defense would have severely limited the employment of th flame gun. At that point the trailer simply becomes a useless appendage inhibiting movement. And then it is simply a more heavily armored gun tank, with the exact same weapon as every other gun tank on the beach. Say we insert six onto the beaches at OMAHA, using two LCT III, that increases the number landed on the beach (assuming otherwise historical events) from 92 to 98, hardly a major increment. OTOH, if we deploy two more LCT III each loaded with 5 M4, we have an increase from 92 to 102. Which was better and a better utilization of spaces? I'm not sure, but frankly I think a better option - in terms of the assault itself and especially if AVRE were not going to be available for the US beaches - at OMAHA was to scrap the LCT (A) concept entirely put in full deckloads of six wading M4 instead, so fitting roughly 54 M4 as opposed to 27 M4 without increasing the number or type of LCT and giving a total of 151 tanks instead of 124 in the assault wave. And possibly more would have arrived if the LCT (A) hadn't been so unstable?
> Sorry, but you are wrong, according to the Tank Museum which has the 141 > Regiment RAC documents. The six (not three) Crocodiles landed on D-Day did > indeed see action *as gun tanks* on 6 June, which is precisely what I said. > The only reason why they did not use their flamethrowers until early on 7 > June (not, incidentally, 8 June as I believe you have said previously), was > because by the time the two troops landed, there were no fortified positions > left to assault in their immediate areas, due to the success of the initial > assault waves.
No need to apologize when you're right Andrew, go ahead and gloat over your fleeting moment of glory, you hardly ever get them. ;) In fact I rather stupidly have been reading the totals I earlier posted comparing the 16th RCT and 231st Brigade tank and LCT assortments and plumb forgot about 69th Brigade on GOLD. It's what happens when you depend too much on memory and start forgetting to double-check things. So yes, a second detachment of 3 apparently from B Squadron (it's not explicitly stated as in the 231st Brigade landing tables) landed. And the first use of the flame gun may well have been on 7 June rather than 8 June. Unfortunately I can't check the 141 RAC War Diary because I haven't reviewed or copied it yet, so there remains little to go on as to what exactly they did on D-Day. But I do have a copy of the rather detailed WO 291/246 "Opposition Encountered on the British Beaches in Normandy on D-Day" and the 50 Division War Diary, I'll review them and see what additional info may be there. But it may be a few days before I can add to this reply, vacation time beckons. :)
> I'm afraid that your argument here thus has no foundation. The facts support > my original claim that, as a heavily armoured gun-tank as well as a > flame-tank, the Crocodile's superior armour might well have enabled it to > survive long enough to use its 75mm gun against the strongpoints so that the > combat engineers would have had a better environment in which to work and > thus may have been able to clear the mines and anti-vehicle obstacles > preventing the close approach of tanks to the pillboxes. And then the flame > would have had utility.
I'm not sure how you get there? You just confirmed they did not use their flame gun on 6 June and, indeed, were not utilized because there "were no fortified positions left to assault in their immediate areas". So they were not opposed by the strongpoints so we have no idea how their superior armor would have faired. And the seaward obstacle gapping teams on the British beaches generally faired better than those at OMAHA, which was the real critical failure point in the Allied plan. If they were unable to do their job due to enemy suppression and the obstacle belt was heavy enough, then it tended to throw the entire assault out of kilter.
> Of course, a mix of gun, flame, and armoured engineering vehicles would have > served even better...
Or better still, directly landing large numbers of any reasonably well armed and armored gun tank with moderate infantry support on the beach at low tide so they could better cover the gapping teams. And land in the intervals between the strongpoints (although that could be problematic too as happened to the teams landing east of Le Hamel.
> At least some and perhaps all of the Mk 3/4 chassis AVRE Petard tanks used > on D-Day had an armour upgrade to Mk 7 standards - 20mm appliqué armour to > the sides, glacis increased to 2 1/4 inches and a new visor (Tank Museum). > This was done to avoid the obvious flaw of up-grading the old 6-pounder Mk > 3/4/5 while ignoring the rather more pressing needs of the AVRE. AFAIK, this > upgrade was not carried out on the engineering vehicle variants of the > AVRE - the Ark and Bobbin so on.
I have not run into any mention of applique armor in the AVRE, but absent a confirmation will accept what you say. But there was *no* difference between a "AVRE Petard" tank and the "engineering vehcile variants", they were all one in the same, except for the ARK and a few of the other bridging variants where the turret was removed, but IIRC only one of that type was available for D-Day and in the end wasn't used. But the Bobbin, Assault Bridge, Log Carpet, and others were "devices" attached to the standard AVRE.
> This meant that the AVRE Petards had the same frontal armour as the > Crocodile (also a Mk 7) - 152mm.
Did you mean the glacis was increased *by* "2 1/4 inches"? Otherwise that doesn't seem to follow? Anyway, yet something else to investigate.
> I have never claimed that the AVRE was a wonder weapon. It was a specialised > engineering vehicle, intended to be used alongside other armoured vehicles > as part of infantry-armour tactical assault task forces. To properly assess > the utility of the AVRE, one must look not exclusively at the tank itself > but also at the success of the task forces which included it. You have done > the former, but not the latter.
Actually, no, I have - partly, and I have posted quite a bit of what I have already found, but it doesn't appear that you have followed it? Quite simply there isn't much of a correlation between the succesful use of the AVRE and the success of the British landings, nor OTOH does there appear to be much of a correlation between the failure of the AVRE and the failure - or additional losses if you will - of the British landings.
> 116th RCT on Omaha were helped to advance off the beach precisely *because* > they had cover from smoke from burning grasses accidentally set alight by > gunfire. In later 21 AG attacks, Crocodiles (and Wasps) were frequently used > to set fires to generate local smoke cover.
> My original comment doesn't seem like any sort of stretch, actually.
Okay, if you want to look at it that way. Of course chemical smoke is probably easier - and safer.
> Why not actually address my point rather than attempt to avoid it?
> Is putting specialist assault armour - as part of all-arms tactical task > groups - onto a heavily defended beach more likely than not to improve the > chances of a successful assault?
No attempt at avoidance, but that wasn't the question as you asked it. And I'm not sure that it can be answered since I don't see the correlations in the actual events - yet. They may be there, but they aren't jumping out at me. It may be telling that the use of the flame tanks and other specialized vehicles has sort of waned over the years? I'm not even sure the RAC/RE still uses the AVRE? Pretyy much now the specialist assault armor in the world has been reduced to mineclearing attachments. I think my answer would have to be that putting more of *any* kind of armor onto the beaches was a good thing and more likely than not to improve the chances of a succesful assault.
Will that do?
> You have again ignored my argument. I said: that "the AVRE was a > heavily-armoured MG platform (used to splendid effect on Gold...". That is > perfectly true. In fact, I could have pointed out the textbook employment of > the AVRE Petards of 81 Sqn 6 Assault Regt at Hable de Heurtot (west of la > Rivière), where several pillboxes were knocked out and the fortification > stormed - precisely the sort of infantry-armour tactical assault envisaged > by Hobart and the 21 AG planners.
Nothing of the sort. Splendid effect equals the 1 at Le Hamel and the 3 at Hable de Heurtot (missed those sorry, the actual report of their action reads "Three Pusher AVRE under comd of Capt KING, 81 Aslt Sqn neutralized by petard and besa fire pillboxes and concrete emplacements housing 50mm guns enfilading beach. Aslt inf advanced. Some held up by enemy behind sloping concrete wall. Wall charged by AVREs and enemy cleared." So 4 out of 40, not 1 out of 40 did "precisely the sort of infantry-armour tactical assault envisaged by Hobart and the 21 AG planners." And please tell me just what in their actions as described could not have been done by any 75mm gun armed tank?
<acl...@nospamstarcott.freeserve.co.uk> wrote: > There is a copy of Hobart's report attached to the Chiefs of Staff's paper > about LVTs (LVT for 21 Army Group") within CAB 79/30/8.
Could you double-check that please? CAB 79/30/8 from the Catalogue covers:
Scope and content 1. Meeting with Directors of Intelligence. 2. Effects of Allied Attacks on the Enemy Oil Situation in Europe. JIC(45)74(O)(Final). 3. Effects of Interrupting the Export of Hard Coal from the Ruhr to the Rest of Germany. JIC(45)60(O)(Final). 4. German Will to Resist. 5. Supplies for the Civilian Population in Holland. JP(45)36(Final). 6. Post War Airfield Policy. COS(45)145(O). 7. Visit by SACSEA to General MacArthur. 8. Proposed Increase in the Numbers of Carabinieri. COS(45)141(O). 9. Supplies to the Channel Islands. WP(45)132. 10. Release of Information to French Air Mission. COS(45)146(O). Covering dates 1945 Mar 06
Where is Hobart? Where are LVTs?
CAB 79/29/6 does include 1. PROVISION OF LVTs FOR OPERATIONS IN ITALY. Is that what you intended? Nope, here it is, CAB 79/30/3 from 28 February 1945 4. LVT-s for 21 Army Group.
> I certainly have a memory of reading about DD tanks being employed at > Westkapelle, but it may have been Shermans equipped for deep wading instead, > or I may have been thinking of Op Vitality, where they certainly were used. > It's a subsidiary point anyway.
Understandable. BTW, one of the four LCT loaded with the assault teams (Flails, assault bridge AVRE, etc) was sunk and the remainder got pretty well bogged - literally.
> (snip for brevity) > You said that 4th Commando at Flushing (the assault wave) were landed by > LCA; it was the *follow-up wave* of 155 Infantry Brigade that used LVT. This > is because the LVT was not regarded as a capable assault vehicle; once the > defences had been breached, the LVT ferried the follow-up troops across the > relatively protected waters of the Scheldt. Note too that when 155 IB > assaulted W3 and W4 on D+1, they were required to disembark from their LVT > *before* the final approach, as the LVT were regarded as "far too > vulnerable" to be used in close action against fixed defences.
Not regarded as a capable assault vehicle by whom? There is certainly nothing to that effect in the report on Infatuate found in WO 171/1797, the 1st Assault Brigade RE War Diary covering the period? Instead it appears to have been a numbers issue, they wanted the maximum number for use at Westkapelle were it was felt the best use of them could be made. And since there were only a limited number available (the brigade reported only 118 operational as of 1 November, albeit 125 were actually employed) and their best employment area was seen to be Westkapelle, they employed 105 there and 20 at Vlissingen.
The requirement was to land three commandos in the assault at Westkapelle and only one at Vlissingen, with the followup at Vlissingen by the elements of 155 Brigade. But it was unclear whether the LVT could cross onto the polder at UNCLE Beach (following a recce by 11 RTR after 4 Commando landed it was established that it could have been done), so the LCA were utilized to land 4 Commando there conserving the LVT for Westkapelle.
> You also said that 4th SS Brigade landed at Westkapelle in LVT *transported > in LCT*. This is true, but is not the whole story. The initial assault wave > at Westkapelle landed in LCA; the follow-up waves then landed from LVT. > Again, the LVT was not used as an assault vehicle. Also, neither was the LVT > exposed to the open sea conditions off Westkapelle; they were transported to > the scene in LCT, in contrast to the Flushing operation where the river > conditions were easier.
I have yet to find a reference to LCA at Westkapelle, somewhere I've got a craft list for Infatuate II, I'll try to track it down. The idea was to land the LVT from the LCT through the gap and into the polder where they could flank the German positions.
But your point about the seas is good, but I'm still wondering what was so different in the North Sea from the Pacific Ocean?
> The use of the LVT at Walcheren thus confirms my original point was that the > LVT "proved incapable of swimming in the tidal and wave conditions > anticipated to be encountered off the Normandy beaches".
> Incidentally, although the LVT was used off the Normandy beaches after the > assault, it was only used for close-range ferrying.
Why yes, I think I already said that? None were apparently used in the assault, although some ambiguous photographic evidence shows them on the beaches possibly as earlier as the evening of D-Day?
> Oh dear. Apart from a mistake of memory about DD tanks, it turns out I was > completely right...
About what? :) The concept of operations for Infatuate made best use of their attributes and used imaginative ways to get around their main problem, which was their slow water speed. But it didn't highlight their "incapability" as an assault craft? Which AFAICS was their slow water speed, lack of a ramp, and low endurance. But I'm mystifiied as to how the ocean in Europe was so much different from in the Pacific that made them incapable assault craft in the one and capable assault craft in the other? But mind you I'm not arguing they would have been more useful on D-Day than LCA or LCVP, except possibly at UTAH and - less likely - at SWORD or GOLD (JUNO and OMAHA for different reasons were very unlikely). :)
On Feb 23, 5:55 am, "Rich" <RichT...@msn.com> wrote:
> I ...plumb forgot about 69th Brigade on GOLD. ... > So yes, a second detachment of 3 apparently from B Squadron (it's not > explicitly stated as in the 231st Brigade landing tables) landed. > Unfortunately I can't check the 141 RAC War Diary because > I haven't reviewed or copied it yet, so there remains little to go on > as to what exactly they did on D-Day. But I do have a copy of the > rather detailed WO 291/246 "Opposition Encountered on the British > Beaches in Normandy on D-Day" and the 50 Division War Diary
According to The Plan, 3 x Crocodile landed with 231 Bde on JIG-GREEN at H+35, and 3 x Crocodile landed with 69 Bde on KING-GREEN at H+45
All six are listed as a Det from C Sqn, 141 RAC.
There is a bit, albeit second hand, about the Crocs on D-Day in Wilson's "Flamethrower". IIRC, 2 or 3 quickly got stuck in craters or otherwise didn't get off the beach until they could be recovered a day or so later.
On Feb 27, 12:40 am, "JonS" <jons...@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> All six are listed as a Det from C Sqn, 141 RAC.
Thanks Jon, I should have looked at your more detailed GOLD landing plan documents in the first place. So I wonder if they were two troops or elements of the entire squadron? Two troops would make more sense.
> There is a bit, albeit second hand, about the Crocs on D-Day in > Wilson's "Flamethrower". IIRC, 2 or 3 quickly got stuck in craters or > otherwise didn't get off the beach until they could be recovered a day > or so later.
And thanks for that note as well. The thing is that of course the Crocodiles were effective and frightening weapons systems, but it is unclear that they were more effective than a tank, except in special circumstances. And they were of course subject to all the limitations of a tank, they could be knocked out, break down, get bogged or drowned out. The trailer was vunerable to anything more than small arms fire and could also get bogged or hung up on an obstacle, forcing it to be jettisoned. The RAC Armor Notes at the time stressed they had to be used with adequate supporting fire and in mass, against carefully selected targets, if they were to be fully effective.
So what I object to is the simplistic assumption that they would somehow have "changed" the "outcome" at OMAHA (in this sense I mean reduced casualties, since an actual "change" of the results at OMAHA would have been a repulse :) ), when in fact they did not effect anything at any of the beaches.
On Feb 27, 12:40 am, "JonS" <jons...@yahoo.co.uk> wrote:
> On Feb 23, 5:55 am, "Rich" <RichT...@msn.com> wrote:
> > But I do have a copy of the > > rather detailed WO 291/246 "Opposition Encountered on the British > > Beaches in Normandy on D-Day" and the 50 Division War Diary
Forgot to mention that I went through WO 291/246 and found no mention of any use of Crocodiles on any of the beaches. Nor did the 50 Division War Diary mention them, but then it is rather more telegraphic.
> I wonder if they were two troops > or elements of the entire squadron? Two troops would make more sense.
I don't know, but I vaguely recall that 141RAC initally had the same troop org as any other tank regt, but subsequently (later in the year) went to smaller - 3 tank - troops because the larger ones were overkill in most circumstances.
I meant to look inside "Flamethrower" last night but of course forgot :roll:, but I also recall that 141RAC were suffering from fairly severe equipment shortages, so much so that the six that landed were pretty much all that were available. The six that landed were withdrawn about the 15th June, and then the entire regiment didn't show up in France again till the end of July/early August.
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