I just saw something new & interesting, AEW, Airborne Early Warning in WWII. (posted today in rec.aviation.military http://steeljawscribe.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html ) "April-May 1945. Kamikazes are extracting a heavy price during the invasion of Okinawa. On the 16th of April, a massed-wave of 350 kamikazes hit the fleet; ----- leaders in theater and back in Washington were growing increasingly concerned over the threat kamikazes were presenting and what it portended for DOWNFALL. On the West Coast, USS Ranger was preparing to embark an airwing with several innovations, including the first operational TBM-3Ws in order to provide an organic AEW capability." This was Cadillac I (some pictures can be seen at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/TBF_Avenger )
"Cadillac II for the shore-based variant, the Navy pressed ahead with the procurement of PB-1s (Navy designation for the B-17). --- the conversion to the AEW variant would take place. The modifications began in late 1945 with the first operations in February 1946." The version with the radar dome on top, missed WWII, but certainly portends the developments of much later!
> I just saw something new & interesting, > AEW, Airborne Early Warning in WWII. > (posted today in rec.aviation.military > http://steeljawscribe.blogspot.com/2007_02_01_archive.html > ) > "April-May 1945. Kamikazes are extracting a heavy price during > the invasion of Okinawa. On the 16th of April, a massed-wave of > 350 kamikazes hit the fleet; ----- leaders in theater and back in > Washington were growing increasingly concerned over the threat > kamikazes were presenting and what it portended for DOWNFALL. > On the West Coast, USS Ranger was preparing to embark an airwing > with several innovations, including the first operational TBM-3Ws > in order to provide an organic AEW capability."
"The Cadillac AMTI-system was described in a 1946 National Defense Research Committee technical paper as follows . . . "which is only half the story. The blogger never tells us: 1. Whether the Cadillac AEW system was ever deployed before VJ Day. (We can understand its probable importance for the planned invasion of homeland Japan.) 2. How its performance compared with the USN radar picket (ship) AEW system which we know was deployed to defend the Okinawa region. -- Don Phillipson Carlsbad Springs (Ottawa, Canada)
"Don Phillipson" <e...@SPAMBLOCK.ncf.ca> wrote ...
> "a425couple" <a425cou...@hotmail.com> wrote in ... >> AEW, Airborne Early Warning in WWII.
snip = contains 'sites' etc.
> half the story. The blogger never tells us: > 1. Whether the Cadillac AEW system was ever deployed > before VJ Day. (We can understand its probable importance > for the planned invasion of homeland Japan.) > 2. How its performance compared with the USN radar > picket (ship) AEW system which we know was deployed > to defend the Okinawa region.
Yes. Hopefully somebody may add more. (To be realistic, after the atomic bomb was used almost all military development & building REALLY slowed down. So things came on line much later than could have. "Downfall" would have been protracted. And, if it was delayed, blockaid, really slow. So - - I'd hope that developments at least things through 1948 will be allowed here.)
Yes, the DDs and DEs were used as radar pickets, and greatly helped alert the main fleet. (Figure DD is 375' long, 2,000 tons, crew of 375) But as almost sitting ducks they paid a pretty high price. For Okinawa alone I count DDs sunk: Bush April 6, 1945 Colhoun April 6 Mannert Abele April 12 Pringle April 16 Little May 3, 1945 Luce May 4 (for example on her-126 men died, 57 severly injured) Morrison May 4 Drexler May 28 William Porter June 10 Twiggs June 16 Callaghan July 29 (13th full DD sunk off Oki)
Certainly even a primitive AWACs ability would have helped, perhaps got some better CAP out in time to better protect these pickets and save some. A airplane moving in 3 dimensions at 200 mph is harder for Kamikazes to find than a DD at their fixed posts.
The RAF side of things. From my posting of 30 May to rec.aviation.military
The idea of Air Control of Interception was proposed by Watson-Watt in August 1941, the idea being as a control for fighters intercepting Fw200 over the Atlantic.
The Telecommunications Research Establishment modified Wellington R1629 with a rotating Yagi dipole antenna, 9 inch PPI, high powered transmitter and an ASV II radar. Trials in 1942 and 1943 were quite successful, the system was dismantled in April 1943.
There is a 3 page article on the system by Lawrence Hayward in the spring 2004 edition of Aviation World.
With the use of He111s flying over the North Sea at low level to launch V-1s against the UK the ACI/AWACS was revived as operation Vapour.
This time ASV VI was the radar, trials and some operational sorties were done in January 1945. Sea returns provided the usual low altitude range problem, at higher altitudes aircraft were detected at 14 miles range. Just as the system was being put into operation the Luftwaffe effectively ceased He111 V-1 operations. The only interceptions made were of allied aircraft.
The plan was to convert the Wellingtons of 407 squadron into airborne control, with the step after that to use B-24s for round the clock coverage.
It was fun if you were in the Mosquito XXX, to stay with the Wellington, you flew with flaps and undercarriage down, at low altitude.
On Oct 25, 3:42 pm, "a425couple" <a425cou...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> "Downfall" would have been protracted. > And, if it was delayed, blockaid, really slow. > So - - I'd hope that developments at least things through > 1948 will be allowed here.)
An interesting sidebar here.
I'm in the middle of reading Admiral Leahy's book "I Was There". Leahy states DOWNFALL would most likely never have taken place. FDR and the majority of the JCS believed Japan would surrender before DOWNFALL became necessary. He also states he knew very little of MANHATTAN and thought it unlikely it would be effective as a military weapon. Assuming he was as well informed as the rest of the JCS, the consensus was a naval blockade & strategic bombing would be enough to finish off Japan. MacArthur & Nimitz were authorized to plan DOWNFALL, but no more. As he puts it "the invasion itself was never authorized."
On Oct 25, 11:09 pm, Alan <alan_nor...@comcast.net> wrote:
> Leahy [says] FDR and the majority of the JCS believed Japan > would surrender before DOWNFALL became necessary... > the consensus was a naval blockade & strategic bombing > would be enough...
In his memoir _Eight Bells_, RAdm Dan Gallery said otherwise.
In September 1944, Gallery gave up command of GUADALCANAL (the escort carrier that had captured U-505), and went to the Pentagon as "Assistant Director of Plans" in the office of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.
Then-Captain Gallery "also was the alternate for RAdm John Cassady on the Joint Logistics Committee of the [JCS]... [which] had to okay the logistic feasibility of all operational plans before the [JCS] would give final approval...
So when the plan for invasion of Japan came up before the [JLC] I naively raised the question, Why invade at all?
I should of stood in bed, The Army and Air Corps members looked at me as if I had just puked on the table."
I guess they were not aware of the "consensus",
> [ Leahy] also states he knew very little of MANHATTAN and > thought it unlikely it would be effective as a military weapon.
Leahy told Truman "The atomic bomb will never go off, and I speak as an expert in explosives." Of course that was before TRINITY.
On Oct 24, 6:20 pm, "Don Phillipson" <e...@SPAMBLOCK.ncf.ca> wrote:
> 1. Whether the Cadillac AEW system was ever deployed > before VJ Day. (We can understand its probable importance > for the planned invasion of homeland Japan.)
"The Location of US Navy Aircraft 08/04/45" shows only 1 TBM-3W which was assigned to the Aircraft Division ASDEVLANT at Quonset Point, RI [page 50 of the report]. The same report also shows an AEWTU (Airborne Early Warning Training Unit) at Ream Field in Imperial Beach, CA, with no aircraft assigned [page 35 of the report].
The same report for 09/07/45 (unfortunately the last) shows the same results.
> In his memoir _Eight Bells_, RAdm Dan Gallery said otherwise.
> In September 1944, Gallery gave up command of GUADALCANAL > (the escort carrier that had captured U-505), and went to the > Pentagon as "Assistant Director of Plans" in the office of the > Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.
> Then-Captain Gallery "also was the alternate > for RAdm John Cassady on the Joint Logistics Committee of > the [JCS]... [which] had to okay the logistic feasibility of all > operational plans before the [JCS] would give final approval...
> So when the plan for invasion of Japan came up before the > [JLC] I naively raised the question, Why invade at all?
> I should of stood in bed, The Army and Air Corps members > looked at me as if I had just puked on the table."
> I guess they were not aware of the "consensus",
> > [ Leahy] also states he knew very little of MANHATTAN and > > thought it unlikely it would be effective as a military weapon.
> Leahy told Truman "The atomic bomb will never go off, and > I speak as an expert in explosives." Of course that was before > TRINITY.
Mr Rostrom,
My apologies. Upon completion of the book, Leahy makes it clear his conviction that DOWNFALL would not be necessary, later fell out of favor. Once Truman became president he may have been alone on this. Though DOWNFALL wasn't ever authorized, he makes it plain it probably would have been. I suspect by the time Adm Gallery is speaking of the tide had turned.
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