What concerns me mainly, and this is by no means meant to be a criticism of
Montgomery, nor the British and Canadians who landed, is that it is always
stated (or at least implied) that the Americans were foolish to have refused
any variant (at least for the initial landings) other than the DD's, yet it
appears (at least to me) that a major problem on Sword and Juno shortly
following the initial waves was a major back-up in getting AFV's landed.

That back up seems to be one of the reasons why the British had problems and
delays just up the road to Caen when they ran into several German strong
points (Hill 110?) that were either missed by allied intelligence altogether
or were severely underestimated by the same. What appears to have happened
(other than the old "stopped for tea" canard) is that there were
insufficient Sherman's (or better yet Fireflies) on hand to support the
infantry units that were held up at these points. I

If I could find specific numbers and types landed and when (vs planned
numbers, types and times) it would be easier to compare the results at each
of the beaches. One thing I suspect as well is that more of the funnies were
needed on Sword and Juno simply because they were more urban in character
than the American beaches. If that were so it would also be nice to see from
AAR's which specialized AFV's accomplished their intended tasks and helped
get the troops off the beach.

Also, given that the Firefly was a superior type, why weren't they massed
rather than spread out amongst the Royal Tank Regiments, especially on D-Day
June 6, 1944?

Please forgive my lack of specificity, but I'm in the middle of moving and
all of my books that recount the DD landings are currently packed away.

thanks,

Add on that the 17pdr had  poor HE ability when not firing Shot,
it isn't the best thing for dealing with PF equipped infantry and
 AT Guns, the two things that killed more Allied Armor than
the Panzers.

Esp. since it also lost the bow MG, given up for more main gun
rounds(77) vs 97 75mm rounds

The Firefly was good at shooting thru thick armor, and little else.

There wasn't a lot of heavy armor on or just off the beaches, thats
why
they got those 95mm armed Centaurs, which had a very good
HE and Smoke round. Things on Sword Beach wouldn't have gone
as well had those been Fireflys instead

Unfortunately, there are enough holes in the story to drive an AVRE
through it. :) The following is the draft as it currently exists of
the section in my book dealing with the subject.

"It has long been accepted as a truism that, unlike the British Army,
the U.S. Army was resistant to the use of specialist assault vehicles
and that that resistance in part led to the severe casualties suffered
on OMAHA Beach. After some investigation though, it appears that this
viewpoint may actually have originated from a single source. Chester
Wilmot in The Struggle for Europe stated that:

"There might have been some justification for the policy of direct
assault if the Americans had accepted Montgomery's plan for landing
armour en masse at the start of the attack, and for using the
specialized equipment of Hobart's 79th Armoured Division to deal with
the fortifications and the underwater obstacles. When Montgomery first
saw this equipment he ordered Hobart to make one-third of it available
to the Americans, and set himself to interest Eisenhower and Bradley
in its revolutionary employment. Hobart's account of the reaction of
the three generals is illuminating." (This paragraph was footnoted,
This account was given to me by General Hobart on November 10th,
1946.)

""Montgomery," he says, "was most inquisitive. After thorough tests
and searching questions he said in effect: 'I'll have this and this
and this; but I don't want that or that.' Eisenhower was equally
enthusiastic but not so discriminating. His response was, 'We'll take
everything you can give us.' Bradley appeared to be interested but,
when asked what he wanted, replied, 'I'll have to consult my staff.'"

Bradley and his staff eventually accepted the 'DDs' but did not take
up the offer of 'Crabs', 'Crocodiles', 'AVREs' and the rest of
Hobart's menagerie." (Chapter XIII, page 265.)

Of course the problem with this is that the "documented" evidence that
an offer of the British "Funnies" was made and refused appears to
consist solely of the "father" of the Funnies making comments from
memory to a reporter postwar about this pivotal decision. Eisenhower's
papers contain two or possibly three references to the demonstration
on 27 January by 617 Assault Squadron RE. On 29 January 1944 he wrote
a personnel note to General Hobart thanking him for the demonstration,
stating that he was "much impressed with all your work and the
training you are doing" and that he "should like some of my senior
officers to see what I did as I know how much they would profit by
it."  (Entry 1522, Eisenhower Mss. to Percy Cleghorn Stanley Hobart,
January 29, 1944, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower, The War
Years, Volume III, Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., editor, The Johns Hopkins
Press, Baltimore, MD, 1970.) ."  But he does not mention any of the
Funnies specifically, or any meeting between he, Montgomery, Bradley,
and Hobart, or of any "offer" being either accepted or rejected. Later
on 7 February in a note to Nicholas Straussler, Eisenhower
specifically mentions Straussler's invention, the DD tank, and
comments that he was "looking forward to the day we can use them to
good effect." (Ibid, Entry 1537. Eisenhower specifically mentions
riding in a DD at the demonstration at Fritton, Norfolk, so it is
clear it was not the 27 January demonstration, which was at the Orford
Battle Area, Suffolk. The Fritton demonstration did result in the
decision to convert DD tanks in the U.S., although no U.S.-built DD
tanks were used in the invasion.) But again, there was no mention of
an "offer" or rejection. Finally, in a letter on 9 February to General
Marshall, Eisenhower again mentions the demonstration, but only
commented that the "visit was for the purpose of inspecting special
items of equipment that are designated to help us through that type of
defensive organization."  (Ibid, Entry 1539.)

Nor is there any mention of such a meeting in Bradley's papers, or in
the papers of the SHAEF AFV&W Section, the Historical Report of the
First Army Armor Section.  Chief of the Imperial General Staff General
Alan Brooke's diary entry for 27 January 1944 shows that he was
present as well (although he is not mentioned in the Hobart/Wilmot
account).  (Patrick Delaforce in The Story of Hobart's Funnies does
mention an incident that apparently occurred at the 27 January
demonstration that shows at least some AVRE were also demonstrated.
"Major Roland Ward of 617 Assault Squadron relates: 'Dick Stafford's
AVRE fell over upside down off an Assault bridge in trying to climb
over a wall in the Orford battle area. Eisenhower ran forward quite
concerned for the crew, but 'Hobo' said 'Don't worry - they do it
every day.'" Delaforce then adds "Although Eisenhower was impressed
with 'Funnies' and Montgomery offered them to the American forces on D-
Day, General Bradley turned the offer down.")

Eisenhower met me at the station last night and we traveled up by
special train through the night. Hobart collected us at 9 am and took
us first to his HQ where he showed us his models, and his proposed
assault organisation. We then went on to see various exhibits such as
the Sherman tank for destroying tank mines, with chains on a drum
driven by an engine, various methods of climbing walls with tanks,
blowing up of minefields and walls, flame throwing Churchill tanks,
wall destroying engineer parties, floating tanks, teaching men how to
escape from sunken tanks, etc, etc. A most interesting day, and one
which Eisenhower seemed to enjoy thoroughly. Hobart has been doing
wonders in his present job and I am delighted that we put him into it.

Brooke thus confirms that the Sherman Crab mine-clearing vehicle was
demonstrated, but of course that wasn't a new vehicle since it was a
development of the well-known Matilda Baron and Crab developed in
North Africa in 1942. It is evident that the demonstration also
included various bridging vehicles, probably prototypes of the SBG and
Ark, demolition vehicles, Crocodiles, hand emplaced demolitions
(possibly Wade charges?), and DD tanks and their associated escape
gear. Note the curious phraseology used, Hobart also displayed
"models" and a "proposed" organization, implying that at that time at
least some of the actual functioning vehicles and an actual assault
organization did not exist, or was not complete. That assumption
appears to be confirmation of what was said in the 1st Assault Brigade
War Diary (see below).

Finally, mention is made of the 27 January demonstration in a 79th
Armoured Division document. It states that in a meeting following the
demonstration it was agreed that First U.S. Army technical
representatives were to see the new equipment on 11 February after
which they were to inform the British of their requirements.
Furthermore, this document explicitly states that General Bradley was
at that post-demonstration meeting on 27 January, so presumably also
witnessed the demonstration. However, what is not said is that an
"offer" was made to the Americans at that meeting or that the
Americans refused it.

In fact the U.S. Army developed a wide variety of specialist equipment
and vehicles, but due to various reasons many were not used or were
only used in limited numbers. The reason for that was at least partly
institutional in the sense that elements in the Army were suspicious
of "foreign" (i.e., British) tactical innovations that hadn't been
tested. But as in many other things the fundamental reasons again were
simply production, availability and experience."

I haven't revisted that for a few months and it needs some more work,
but that still fundamentally stands. I still have yet to find a
"smoking gun" document that can confirm that an "offer" or "refusal"
ever occured, except for Hobart's remarks to Wilmot. Even more
interesting, since then I've found that it was intended that the US
Tank Battalions in the assault be fitted with the armored-box 7.2-inch
multiple rocket launcher for uses similar to the AVRE Petard. But they
were removed prior to the invasion (the attachment points can be seen
on numerous photos of the tanks) because the launcher weight increased
the center of gravity in the LCT (A) they were to be loaded on to such
an extent that they were in danger of capsizing (some did anyway).

The US accepted the funnies in principle, however they only took up DDs (a
funny)for whatever reason.  It was clear if the funnies were used at Omaha
the slaughter would have been averted. There have been many excuses given
why the US never took up the full range of funnies, buit take them up they
never.

The issue of congested beach exits at Sword and Juno certainly hindered
inland exploitation of the beachhead, but it is worth remembering that while
British and Canadian forces did not get as far inland as planned, at Omaha
troops did not get inland at all...

(snip matters ably dealt with by Rich)

You thus have a noted expert saying something which is perfectly likely,
albeit from memory slightly after the event. That's a moderately strong
primary source. The fact you haven't found anything to corroborate that
source doesn't mean that the first source is wrong: it simply means it is
uncorroborated.

Might I suggest, before rushing to publication, you search British sources,
particularly WO 219?

It's not conclusive evidence of an offer but it would seem odd to
study the funnies if they weren't going to be available,

Cheers,

But since when are Delaforce, Wilmot, and Alanbooke American?

In any case, I haven't yet touched on the second set of problems that
show that Hobart's "explanation" was somewhat disingenous....or maybe
simplistic is a better word?

For one, conversions of the AVRE did not begin until December 1943 and
issues to and training of units did not begin until April.
Essentially, the only operational AVRE units available 6 June 1944
were those committed on the British beaches, the "reserve" 42 Assault
Regiment RE, was still training and equipping. Herewith another
snippet:

"On D-Day the actual availability of AVRE were SWORD Beach 34, JUNO
Beach 47, and GOLD Beach 40, for a total of 121. This may be compared
to the distribution as given in the Engineer Outline Plan (WO
205/1170) of SWORD Beach 30, JUNO Beach 28, and GOLD Beach 44, for a
total of 102. In other words 19 more AVRE were actually landed than
were originally planned. Furthermore, the original engineer plan
called for arrival of the "residue" of 5th and 6th Assault Regiments
by D+27 with an additional 104 AVRE and the arrival of the reserve
42nd Assault Regiment with 104 more on D+30 "or later."

However, by D-Day just 180 AVRE conversions had been completed,
meaning that over two-thirds of those available were committed to the
assault. Furthermore, the theoretical war establishment for the
squadrons was intended to be 26, which would have meant that the 6
squadrons deployed on D-Day, should have had 156 AVRE and the full
brigade (12 squadrons) 312. By that measure the squadrons landed on D-
Day were actually 35 short of establishment, while the 180 actually
produced left the brigade 132 short of establishment. It is also
problematic whether or not all of the AVRE produced up to D-Day had
been in fact delivered to the brigade (see below).

Finally, the 1st Assault Brigade History (WO 205/1160) makes clear the
hurried nature of the brigade organization. Initially conceived in May
1943 after exercise KRUSCHEN in March had illustrated the shortfalls
in engineer assault technique, personnel organization wasn't complete
until the end of October 1943 with the assignment of 26 Field
Squadron, RE (Guards Independent Brigade), 222 Field Company, RE (47th
Infantry Division), 284th Field Company, RE (38th Infantry Division),
and 557th Field Company (55th Infantry Division) to the brigade.
During the winter of 1943-44 and early spring 1944 the brigade was
fully occupied in organization, training and experimentation. But the
process was badly restricted in that only 36 "decrepit Churchill gun
tanks" and 51 RAC personnel had been assigned to the brigade for
training, experimentation and familiarization.  The first completed
AVRE did not arrive until early April 1944 and even then many did not
arrive with Petards installed, a task that was added to the regular
maintenance jobs of the Brigade R.E.M.E. Company.

It is also notable that the Assault Brigade never actually was able to
achieve its planned war establishment. By 1 September, with all 12
squadrons on the continent, the brigade only fielded 217 AVRE, still
95 short of establishment. Partly in response to tactical
requirements, but also apparently in response to the limited number of
AVRE available, the brigade establishment was changed, so that by VE-
Day it comprised eight assault squadrons, each with 20, and one
experimental squadron with 26 AVRE, for a brigade total of 186.

It appears incredible that, given these circumstances, any realistic
"offer" of AVRE for use on the American beaches could ever have been
made. And yet the claim that such an "offer" was made and
"refused" (usually General Omar Bradley is the scapegoat) appears time
after time. For instance "the British factored the Funnies and their
various capabilities into their assault plan, and demonstrated the
vehicles to the commander of the US 1st Army, Lieutenant-General Omar
Bradley. Bradley rejected them all except one...."  One may perhaps be
forgiven for wondering how exactly the US forces were to have been
organized, trained and equipped with AVRE when there was barely time
for the British to complete such an organization. And one also may
wonder where exactly these additional AVRE were to come from, since
the numbers supplied were inadequate for equipping the British units
already organized."

And then there was the ongoing problem of LCT availability. Deploying
similar numbers of AVRE to the American beaches, say 60, and their
ancilliary equipment and vehciles, would have required another 35 or
so LCT.

So the result was that the US Army did its best to make do and adapt.
One attempt to do so, utilizing the M17 "Whizbang" 7.2-inch rocket
launchers, would have probably been as spectacularly successful as the
Petard, by all accounts the effects of the rockets on an emplacement
were spectacular. It was also planned to use the US mineclearing tank
equipment, but the units and equipment were delayed and di not arrive
until September, so tankdozers were utilized as an expedient
replacement.

Two series of demonstrations by the first "test" squadrons equipped
with the few AVRE then available were held in late January and early
February for assorted Allied brass. All agreed they were useful and
Bradley, as the officer most concerned on the US side, "staffed" it as
was appropriate.

But when the staffwork was done it must have been obvious that the
only way such an offer could have been effective would have been if
the commitment of AVRE and units to the Commonwealth beaches had been
reduced by 40 percent, along with the required LCT, and then made
available for US use. But, since plans were already in place for their
use in substantially their original strength, the second available
option was taken, make do (which actually was the option of choice in
most cases for NEPTUNE, for both the Commonwealth and US).

Of course I haven't been able to find the memo/document that
corroborates either version, which is why all this remains a draft
right now. :)

WO 205/1120 Employment of Assault RE
WO 205/1159 79th AD Final Report
WO 205/1160 1st Assault Brigade RE
WO 205/1170 RE Report on Normandy, Jun-Jul 44
WO 205/1171 Employment of Mechanical Equipment RE During the Campaign
WO 171/1797 1 Assault Bde RE, May-Dec 44
WO 171/1800 5 Assault Regt
WO 171/1801 6 Assault Regt
WO 171/1803 16 Sq
WO 171/1804 26 Sq
WO 171/1805 42 Sq
WO 171/1806 77 Sq
WO 171/1807 79 Sq
WO 171/1808 80 Sq
WO 171/1809 81 Sq
WO 171/1810 82 Sq
WO 171/1811 87 Sq
WO 171/1812 149 Park Sq
WO 171/1813 222 Sq
WO 171/1814 284 Sq
WO 171/1815 557 Sq
WO 171/1816 617 Sq

WO 219/2806 Tank Allocations: Armor, Ammo and Other, Feb-Dec 44
WO 219/2808 Tank Dozers: Requirements and Allocations, Mar 44-Mar 45
WO 219/3350-3353 Tanks and SP Equipment, 21 AG Weekly Returns
WO 291/246 Opposition Encountered by British on the Beaches

And so on (WO 229 is also useful).

The events at Omaha are a different kettle of fish, but I will note several
things to stir it up a bit, number one is the US had the same mix of forces
at Utah and did just fine establishing the beachhead inland there. Number
two, to my knowledge the topography at Omaha would appear to strain the
support capabilities of any adapted AFV. It took close in and extended
pounding by the Royal Navy to destroy the strong points covering the
strongpoints that guarded the Omaha exits up the draws, without which
Bradley would almost have certainly had to carry through wih his withdrawal
orders.

Perhaps a better question for history is why did the Allies not learn from
the Italian campaign and utilize in Europe the one force that would most
seem to have the experience, vehicles and capability to more effectively
assault Omaha and that was the US Marines with their assortment of LTV's.

You are correct, the topography of OMAHA severely limited what any AFV
could accomplish there. But you are not correct regarding the RN
destroying the strongpoints , that in theory was mostly done by US
destroyers, DESRON 18:
Division 35: USS Frankford (SF), Carmick, Doyle, Endicott, and McCook
Division 36: USS Baldwin (DF), Harding, Satterlee, and Thompson,
supported by HMS Tanatside, Talybont and Melbreak. In fact though few
of the German strongpoints were knocked out by naval gunfire.

My real problem is with the inference that the "refusal" if such ever
occured, was "stupid" or done because of some rabid "anti-Britishness"
or "not invented hereishness", rather than the consequence of the many
real factors that were in play, some of which I have tried to
highlight.

So yes, in fact I rather believe that the generals all thought they
were splendid ideas (well, Panjandrum I'm not so sure about :)) and
agreed that they should be used on all the beaches. But practically
speaking any such offer, no matter how sincere, of neccessity was
premature, since they had little idea of how many AVRE.... and for
that matter, many other things....would have been available by May or
June.

In other words there is little "blame" to place anywhere in this
matter and recriminations of any kind are rather silly. Take the whole
matter of the "offer" off the table and the possibilities are:

1) Delay another month so that 42 Assault Regiment is available to
support the Americans.
1a) Hope that the additional LCT are also available then.
1b) Hope that another month delay will not allow the Germans to place
even more countermeasures in the way.
2) Dealy another month plus so that the US mineclearing equipment and
units are available.
2a) Hope that the additional LCT are also available then.
2b) Hope that another month plus delay will not allow the Germans to
place even more countermeasures in the way.
3) Allocate an equal portion of the available AVRE and LCT from the
Commonwealth to the American forces and go as planned.
3a) Hope the last minute changes doesn't screw up the Commonwealth
assault plan too much.
3b) Hope the last minute changes and unfamiliar equipment and tactics
introduced into the American environment doesn't screw up the American
assault plan too much.
4) Go as planned with what is available, distributed as it is
available.

There are probably more variations on 1-3, but I doubt any of them
would be that much better than 4.

As to my reference to the Marines it was meant to cover several things,
first of all the Allies have taken a lot of heat (as you point out) for not
"hitting them where they ain't" so to speak. But when Montgomery and
Eisenhower chose to expand the initial COSSAC plans (and to focus the
American right flank on Cherbourg) they had limited options on where to land
the forces to ensure the most cohesive lodgment. That in turn lead to the
decision to make a daylight, frontal assault with a very limited (compared
to previous allied landings in the Mediterranean and the Pacific)
pre-landing bombardment. The Marine planners had much more experience with
that type of assault combined with naval forces and may have been more
forceful in demanding a more sustained and accurate pre-attack pounding.

Two, although Bradley gives much credit to the US 1st Division on OMAHA,
using that particular Division was a two edged sword, they had plenty of
experience and many of the veterans resented once again being at the front
of the assault and there is some truth to the notion that green troops, if
well lead, are more likely to be initially bold than units that have been
repeatedly exposed to combat. Given the length of the run up to Normandy, I
think the US would have had the time and resources to field a third marine
division for that purpose.

Last, your observations about the LTV's are correct, there is no doubt that
the Sherman DD's were still the best option, but the fact does remain that
by that time in the war there were a number of proven variants of those
vehicles such as mortar and rocket launch equipped ones to have made an
impact on the beach, not only against the German forces there, but as well
as the psychological lift they would have provided the assaultng infantry.
I'm going out on a limb here, but it would also seem that they were more
well suited (at least to the initial wave) as amphibious vehicles than the
DD's.

Certainly the destroyers which closed on the beach and provided the
direct fire support which facilitated the eventual breakout from the
beach area were mostly (all?) USN ships and not RN vessels.

Unfortunately though the best support rendered by the gunfire support
forces in NEPTUNE was in eliminating the German coastal artillery
defenses, which substantially reduced the threat to the transports and
the run in by the craft. Virtually all were destroyed or surpressed in
the bombardment. But the prime killers at OMAHA were the beach defense
emplacements, most of which were in full defilade and so essentially
invisible to naval gunfire.

Further, the German defenses were ultimately breeched by penetrating
between the strongpoints and were reduced from the flanks and rear.
The naval support was a morale boost and was intimidating to the
defenders, but it appears that at about the time they began their
famous close in action is after the strongpoints began to collapse.
Indeed, BG Norm Cota was nearly killed when destroyers opened on the
Vierville exit, which he was approaching FROM THE REAR with a party
from the Rangers and 116th Infantry that had gone over the bluffs.

Also, although the Marines were basically unopposed during the actual
landings on Guadalcanal, there was heavy opposition on the subsidiary
landings Tulagi or one of the other two, I won't even try and spell them
this late, but in at least one of those instances it had been assumed that
there wasn't going to be any opposition, so there was no pre-landing
bombardment or airstrikes at all. Experiences that one would expect to be
taken into account when planning for future landings.

Even though this is a grand foray into "what-if land" conducted on usenet,
not the greatest or easiest way to communicate thoughts, I have thought
about it for awhile. Like I said, I was surprised to learn from your earlier
post that more of the American DD's had landed on Omaha than I knew about.
I've never seen a reference (at least to the initial wave) of more than two
or three contributing to that early part of the battle.

What's more common is the version where the seas were simply too heavy and
that the DD's were set off too far from shore and that is why I've always
come back to the thought that at least the "amtanks" would have stood a much
better chance of making it to the beach and providing some support. So in
that case, better the howitzer on the beach than the one on the seabed.