It's not their ability to calculate that prevents computers from having believable AI. A calculator can calculate. However a calculator does not have the instructions for moral judgement. To have moral judgment requires feelings (or something that simulates feelings). If not... how can something distinguish between a desirable and undesirable moral outcome (beyond a narrow band of instructions) Until that algorithm is added computers will remain glorified calculators.
Now if that ever changes, and they can demonstrate moral judgment... then perhaps we will see a new form of government run by machines (Maybe they'll even replace us eventually-or more probably a synthesis might occur)
On Nov 5, 4:31 pm, Potroast <ilou...@hotmail.com> wrote:
> Until that algorithm is added computers will remain glorified calculators.
I'd like to retract that last sentence. It's too harsh an analogy that detracts from the richness of what computers have to offer. Your links are good examples of the kinds of things they can do that fall beyond the scope of my trusted Texas T1-34.
Computers don't yet have intelligence (albeit programmers like to use the term "AI") but they are still far more than "glorified calculators" (I really regret saying that) While a computer does calculate (using much the same transistor based logic gate technology) there are significant conceptual differences over a basic calculator that make a world of difference. Although the component technology between calculators and PCs is similar- conceptually a calculator's functionality is closer to Herman Hollerith's 19th century punch card machine than modern computers
Putting aside some newer calculators are like small computers.... the big difference between a computer and basic calculator is that a computer can have its programming easily adjusted (i.e. software) whereas a basic calculator usually is limited a small range of hardwired tasks
Theoretically one could create something akin to a calculator that does everything a computer does but creating a distinct piece of hardware for every function would be very expensive (and thus impractical). What makes the computer fundamentally different is its versatility. Rather than relying on dedicated hardware (or later firmware)... software makes the task of adding functionality possible (which is light years ahead of taking out a soldering iron every time we want to do something new)
Potroast wrote: > On Nov 5, 4:31 pm, Potroast <ilou...@hotmail.com> wrote: >> Until that algorithm is added computers will remain glorified calculators. <snip>
> Theoretically one could create something akin to a calculator that > does everything a computer does but creating a distinct piece of > hardware for every function would be very expensive (and thus > impractical).
Prior to Moore's Law, this is exactly how it was. And a computer is nothing but a large collection of distinct controllers and devices - they've just been made ruthlessly cheap.
> What makes the computer fundamentally different is its > versatility. Rather than relying on dedicated hardware (or later > firmware)... software makes the task of adding functionality possible > (which is light years ahead of taking out a soldering iron every time > we want to do something new)
Your basic premise... "feelings" figure prominently in human decision making. People who have had strokes which disable the amygdala can't make decisions any more.
> Your basic premise... "feelings" figure prominently in human > decision making. People who have had strokes which disable the > amygdala can't make decisions any more.
On Nov 6, 8:40 pm, Les Cargill <lcargil...@comcast.net> wrote:
> Your basic premise... "feelings" figure prominently in human > decision making. People who have had strokes which disable the > amygdala can't make decisions any more.
It makes perfect sense. How does one make a decision without some motivating factor? Where does that initial push or purpose come from other than what we broadly term "feelings"? Reason is the mechanism humans use to fulfill our purposes. Where do purposes like the urge to live come from?
There is of course constant feedback via reason also. I might desire that money should grow on trees (money being essentially the modern expression of food, shelter, etc...) However, when I observe the world I see it doesn't. Thus I become disappointed... a feeling... which adjusts my purpose which makes me use reason to find the necessities of life in some other way. Or perhaps I am given an education so I don't need to check if money grows on trees and can work for it. Again though...why do I accept that education in the first place? Because I was spanked or rewarded as a child not because I was born fully mature and able to rationalize why I needed an education.
Unfortunately we lack a detailed scientific description for feelings. Which means we lack the accompanying algorithms to describe a key aspect of human intelligence. Which means we can't write code for it. We can create programs that simulate behaviors (e.g. we can imitate the behavior of some types of insects or get a program to play chess) but the big goal line is human-like AI. The problem with current AI is that it has some reason (of the analytic variety) but it has no motives. It can't have motives because it has no feelings. Our approach to AI has been to provide individual motives (a task or behavior). Unfortunately since there so many possible permutations of tasks human intelligence must deal with trying to write them all becomes as unwieldy as trying to write computer code with a soldering iron.
The reason why an operating system is not intelligent is not because it can't reason analytically but because we have to give it explicit instructions to do something (via software) If we didn't it would just sit them humming along doing essentially nothing for eternity. We could (with time) create a computer that appeared intelligent by gradually adding a massive number of programmed scenarios that gave it appearance of intelligence (our approach at the moment) but this imo would not be the essence of intelligence. (although that's still a philosophical statement because for now we can't say for sure that's not how humans work).
There is a big if here. Can feelings be described in an analytic fashion also? Assuming the answer is yes (and I am correct about missing feelings being the problem)..... I have a hunch that the solution to AI is somewhere to be found in Mandelbrot's approach (of fractal fame).
Feelings are these complex behaviors that sometimes appear almost random. Mandelbrot saw large seemingly random shapes as the result of very small much simpler patterns that through repetition formed into those more complex shapes. Besides accurately describing things like the growth of trees and forests... this approach has turned out to have very practical applications in computer programming (e.g. the inspiration behind modern anti-aliasing received its inspiration from Mandelbrot as well as the polygon approach to generating 3D graphics engines) .
The specific reason why I think a smaller description to AI will be the "solution" (rather than just trying to program every permutation of behavior) is because of the way human life starts off, We were all a tiny fertilized egg at some point. Our DNA is even smaller. Putting aside theories that the universe started off as a tiny singularity... because of our DNA's tiny size it appears likely there are physics limitations as to how much information our DNA is capable of containing. Yet despite that we still ended up with our immensely complicated bodily functions and intelligence.
So my bet is the code to write general purpose AI intelligence is rather small. We just don't know what that algo is yet (or possibly algos).
Sergeant Malenoid wrote: > Les Cargill <lcargil...@comcast.net> wrote in > news:hd2j65$tkv$1@news.eternal-september.org: > .. > .. >> Your basic premise... "feelings" figure prominently in human >> decision making. People who have had strokes which disable the >> amygdala can't make decisions any more.
> Or they just don´t want to.
I've not seen that conclusion drawn. I have seen the conclusion that they cannot. Our intelligence apparently includes emotion at a very core level.
> Sergeant Malenoid wrote: > > Les Cargill <lcargil...@comcast.net> wrote in > >news:hd2j65$tkv$1@news.eternal-september.org: > > .. > > .. > >> Your basic premise... "feelings" figure prominently in human > >> decision making. People who have had strokes which disable the > >> amygdala can't make decisions any more.
> > Or they just don´t want to.
> I've not seen that conclusion drawn. I have seen the conclusion > that they cannot. Our intelligence apparently includes emotion > at a very core level.
> -- > Les Cargill
And intelligence is not only connected to emotions. There appears to be a very specific connection between emotions and moral reasoning.
Joshua Greene is on the cutting edge of essentially a new field that is trying to bridge science and philosophy. (neurophilosophy). What makes Mr. Greene's research unique is that he decided to examine how moral reasoning works on a biological level. The ability to image a living brain is a relatively new technology. Greene uses MRI while posing all sorts of different types of moral questions to subjects. His research while not some panacea of ultimate philosophy does gives some concrete scientific evidence that emotions can play a role in moral judgment. (which really is self-evident given people tend to focus on behaviors that bring them pleasure not pain)
If I had to guess I think the trick to better understanding feelings will be getting down to the nitty gritty resolution of something like a neuron and how it interacts with other neurons And just as our brain can be broken down to a collection of smaller similar neurons... neurons can themselves can be broken down into smaller repetitive structures. This is just one more reason why I suggest Mandelbrot's approach to complex shapes seems most likely to create a believable AI. It would mimic the way our brains appear to actually work.
We'll probably see androids at some point in this century. We are already seeing technology like Sony's AIBO (which allowed hobbyists to import and write their own code to create behaviors) It's only a matter of time before that gets married to technology like Honda's ASIMO and a ubiquitous operating system with an API is created so 3rd parties can add software.
However, IMO (as a long time programmer) trying to code every type of behavior is a tedious approach and not representative of real intelligence. There will still be uncanny valleys where we'll easily be able to spot the difference. And even if we eventually can't, Alan Turing's test for an artificial intelligence is not a good measure of intelligence alone. The test's focus is on whether a computer program can fool someone for some arbitrary period of time.... not whether the program is reasoning the way humans do. It's sort of like the difference between a diamond and cubic zirconia. Or comparing a car to a horse and wagon, They may appear the same on the surface or the behavior might be similar in some respect, but on closer inspection their are huge internal differences.
This isn't to say that the behavioral/task-oriented approach to programming doesn't have its own rewards (which is really what the modern computer represents) but I don't see it that intelligence as analogous to human intelligence yet despite that the term "artificial intelligence" is often used. I would assert to be intelligent like humans by definition requires the intelligence have something that mimics feelings (since that's one of the key properties of every human brain)
Of course even we create a feeling computer the argument can be made it is still only a golem. However, if it logically uses the exact same principles as a human brain the question becomes much murkier. What would make make silicon based intelligence less real than a carbon based intelligence? Is the essence of "intelligence" the specific material used or the mathematics behind it? Given we share much the same genetic materials as a frog or potato... I would say the logic rather than materials is the defining property of intelligence. (Although this doesn't not necessarily mean that the intelligence is "alive" which is a distinct issue)
And intelligence is not only connected to emotions. There appears to be a very specific connection between emotions and moral reasoning.
Joshua Greene is on the cutting edge of essentially a new field that is trying to bridge science and philosophy. (neurophilosophy). What makes Mr. Greene's research unique is that he decided to examine how moral reasoning works on a biological level. The ability to image a living brain is a relatively new technology. Greene uses MRI while posing all sorts of different types of moral questions to subjects. His research while not some panacea of ultimate philosophy does gives some concrete scientific evidence that emotions can play a role in moral judgment. (which really is self-evident given people tend to focus on behaviors that bring them pleasure not pain)
If I had to guess I think the trick to better understanding feelings will be getting down to the nitty gritty resolution of something like a neuron and how it interacts with other neurons And just as our brain can be broken down to a collection of smaller similar neurons... neurons can themselves can be broken down into smaller repetitive structures. This is just one more reason why I suggest Mandelbrot's approach to complex shapes seems most likely to create a believable AI. It would mimic the way our brains appear to actually work.
We'll probably see androids at some point in this century. We are already seeing technology like Sony's AIBO (which allowed hobbyists to import and write their own code to create behaviors) It's only a matter of time before that gets married to technology like Honda's ASIMO and a ubiquitous operating system with an API is created (so 3rd parties can add software).
However, IMO (as a long time programmer) trying to code every type of behavior is a tedious approach and not representative of real intelligence. There will still be uncanny valleys where we'll easily be able to spot the difference. And even if we eventually can't, Alan Turing's test for an artificial intelligence is not a good measure of intelligence alone. The test's focus is on whether a computer program can fool someone for some arbitrary period of time.... not whether the program is reasoning the way humans do. It's sort of like the difference between a diamond and cubic zirconia. Or comparing a car to a horse and wagon, They may appear to be the same on the surface or the behavior might be similar in some respect, but on closer inspection their are huge internal differences.
This isn't to say that the behavioral/task-oriented approach to programming doesn't have its own rewards (which is really what the modern computer represents) but I don't see that intelligence as analogous to human intelligence yet (despite that the term "artificial intelligence" is happenstance often used). I would assert to be intelligent like humans by definition requires the intelligence have something that mimics feelings (since that's one of the key properties of every human brain)
Of course even we create a feeling computer the argument can be made it is still only a golem. However, if it logically uses the exact same principles as a human brain the question becomes much murkier. What would make silicon based intelligence less real than a carbon based intelligence? Is the essence of "intelligence" the specific material used or the mathematics behind it? Given we share much the same genetic materials as a frog or potato... I would say the logic rather than materials is the defining property of intelligence. (Although this does not necessarily mean that the intelligence is "alive" which is a distinct issue)
Potroast wrote: > And intelligence is not only connected to emotions. There appears to > be a very specific connection between emotions and moral reasoning.
> Joshua Greene is on the cutting edge of essentially a new field that > is trying to bridge science and philosophy. (neurophilosophy). What > makes Mr. Greene's research unique is that he decided to examine how > moral reasoning works on a biological level. The ability to image a > living brain is a relatively new technology. Greene uses MRI while > posing all sorts of different types of moral questions to subjects. > His research while not some panacea of ultimate philosophy does gives > some concrete scientific evidence that emotions can play a role in > moral judgment. (which really is self-evident given people tend to > focus on behaviors that bring them pleasure not pain)
What's striking to me is that the example "trolley problem" is clearly underpinned by the overall process of evolution. We're anthropic-ly more likely with it than without it.
I realize he's using this to study what regions of the brain do what - to 'reverse engineer" the brain, but the structure here is sub-rational.
> If I had to guess I think the trick to better understanding feelings > will be getting down to the nitty gritty resolution of something like > a neuron and how it interacts with other neurons And just as our > brain can be broken down to a collection of smaller similar neurons... > neurons can themselves can be broken down into smaller repetitive > structures. This is just one more reason why I suggest Mandelbrot's > approach to complex shapes seems most likely to create a believable > AI. It would mimic the way our brains appear to actually work.
Maybe. the problem is that holism and reduction in AI seem to lead to fairly radically different conclusions. Even a ... Kurweil-ian optomism "of course we want to be machines" seems somewhat perverse. It makes a certain Luddism about this palatable.
Ultimately, I'm pretty well convinced that Mandelbrot is simply about data reduction, simplifying representation. It doesn't solve the gross problem at all - the gross problem being that adding all these maps up doesn't yield a coherent whole. The coherence is - surprise - because of the sheer number of iterations of evolutionary power.
We're going "nuanced", but Nature is brute force...
> We'll probably see androids at some point in this century. We are > already seeing technology like Sony's AIBO (which allowed hobbyists to > import and write their own code to create behaviors) It's only a > matter of time before that gets married to technology like Honda's > ASIMO and a ubiquitous operating system with an API is created (so 3rd > parties can add software).
Maybe, but the thing seems somehow quaint, now. Cockroach-sized embedded stuff has revolutionized industry *much* more than any sort of AI.
> However, IMO (as a long time programmer) trying to code every type of > behavior is a tedious approach and not representative of real > intelligence. There will still be uncanny valleys where we'll easily > be able to spot the difference.
Right. It goes pear-shaped in surprising ways.
> And even if we eventually can't, Alan > Turing's test for an artificial intelligence is not a good measure of > intelligence alone. The test's focus is on whether a computer program > can fool someone for some arbitrary period of time.... not whether the > program is reasoning the way humans do. It's sort of like the > difference between a diamond and cubic zirconia. Or comparing a car to > a horse and wagon, They may appear to be the same on the surface or > the > behavior might be similar in some respect, but on closer inspection > their are huge internal differences.
We need to know how puns work.
> This isn't to say that the behavioral/task-oriented approach to > programming doesn't have its own rewards (which is really what the > modern computer represents)
Very much so - you get a long way with FSM oriented technology from a standpoint of getting real work done. Now, that's got a "faux linguistic" component - it's all based in the grammar calculus of Chomsky/et al, but ... it doesn't have *meaning*. I think it also explains his odd ability to draw parallels in politics that aren't very robust.
> but I don't see that intelligence as > analogous to human intelligence yet (despite that the term "artificial > intelligence" is happenstance often used). I would assert to be > intelligent like > humans by definition requires the intelligence have something that > mimics feelings (since that's one of the key properties of every human > brain)
Dogs have feelings, too. Can't prove it*, but I'd be very surprised otherwise. Birds also invite a sort of anthropomorphism that's very seductive.
*yet.
> Of course even we create a feeling computer the argument can be made > it is still only a golem. However, if it logically uses the exact same > principles as a human brain the question becomes much murkier. What > would make silicon based intelligence less real than a carbon > based intelligence? Is the essence of "intelligence" the specific > material used or the mathematics behind it? Given we share much the > same genetic materials as a frog or potato... I would say the logic > rather than materials is the defining property of intelligence.
but logic may well be a deeper structure and may be present in non-lingual species.
> (Although this does not necessarily mean that the intelligence is > "alive" which is a distinct issue)
i still think Issaac Asimov's "start with the ethics of the thing" is critical. Too bad it's so poorly reflected in popular culture.
Potroast wrote: > On Nov 7, 11:52 pm, Les Cargill <lcargil...@comcast.net> wrote: > If I had to guess I think the trick to better understanding feelings > will be getting down to the nitty gritty resolution of something like > a neuron and how it interacts with other neurons And just as our > brain can be broken down to a collection of smaller similar neurons... > neurons can themselves can be broken down into smaller repetitive > structures.
Can you provide your source of evidence for this? I'm not a neuroscientist but I know something about the structure of a basic (there are many types) neuron, and it is not divisible into "smaller repetitive structures".
> This is just one more reason why I suggest Mandelbrot's > approach to complex shapes seems most likely to create a believable > AI. It would mimic the way our brains appear to actually work.
On Nov 8, 2:33 pm, Rod Nibbe <use...@rknibbe.com> wrote:
> Potroast wrote: > > On Nov 7, 11:52 pm, Les Cargill <lcargil...@comcast.net> wrote: > > If I had to guess I think the trick to better understanding feelings > > will be getting down to the nitty gritty resolution of something like > > a neuron and how it interacts with other neurons And just as our > > brain can be broken down to a collection of smaller similar neurons... > > neurons can themselves can be broken down into smaller repetitive > > structures.
> Can you provide your source of evidence for this? > I'm not a neuroscientist but I know something about > the structure of a basic (there are many types) > neuron, and it is not divisible into "smaller > repetitive structures".
I'm not sure I understand your question Rod. Proteins aren't repetitive? Dendrites aren't repetitive? DNA is not repetitive? I'm not a neuroscientist either but it seems self-evident with even a cursory knowledge that many parts of a neuron are essentially the same thing repeated. This is true about practically any part of the human body (e.g Your skin is most small cells repeated) This is precisely why stems cells are so revolutionary because they can theoretically be used to reproduce any other kind of human tissue. (via slight alteration and repetition)
> > This is just one more reason why I suggest Mandelbrot's > > approach to complex shapes seems most likely to create a believable > > AI. It would mimic the way our brains appear to actually work. > > ??
Pulled from the above thread (with a little copy cleanup) ....
"Feelings are these complex behaviors that sometimes appear almost random. Mandelbrot saw large seemingly random shapes as the result of very small much simpler patterns that through repetition formed into those more complex shapes. Besides accurately describing things like the growth of trees and forests... this approach has turned out to have very practical applications in computer programming (e.g. modern anti-aliasing received its inspiration from Mandelbrot as well as the polygon approach for generating 3D graphics)" ...
What I'm saying is that just because feelings don't appear logical doesn't necessarily mean there isn't a precise formula behind them. I suspect the seeming randomness of feelings is the result of repetition of very simple analytic principles that end up forming much more complex behavior. The reason why we aren't all clones of each other is because from instance-to-instance we are subject to different experiences from the environment around us (which can adjust our behavior and apparently can even shape us on a microscopic biological level ala phenotypes)
Going back to my polygon example.. most programmers don't care how we generate 3D graphics (unless creating a 3D engine or some lame flash movie) . It's essentially a black box and we just use some API or software to draw the shape and let OpenGL or the DirectX worry about it. In practice, what's under the hood when you see rich 3d games graphics today (e.g. xbox) is almost always polygon based. The reason why we use polygons (and related polygon mesh) is because the (most popular) alternatives of Nurbs and ray tracing while excellent for prerender film and photo realistic stills are usually substantially slower to process. (and there is also something called sub-division surfaces which is sort of a cross between polygons and the beziers employed by Nurbs but its not my area of expertise). A 3D shape generated by polygons is really just a collection of tiny repeating polygons that create the illusion of being a complex shape
Likewise... there (now) are AI researchers out there that are taking the same programming approach I'm described.. but towards intelligence. Instead of trying to build some vast intelligence via one giant complex program.... they are trying to build it from many many tiny simple programs that interact with one another. Rather than telling them specific complex behaviors, they observe complex behaviors that naturally arise via their interactions (its really of like a zoologist or biologist might) I've heard the term "neural net" applied to describe this approach to AI sometimes. I don't know how much research goes into specifically "feelings" (which is orders of magnitude more complex) but it seems reasonable if someone got the algos right feelings (or something that appears to mimic feelings) would be a natural consequence.
Of course this is all hypothetical and just my own feel for the best approach towards AI research. No one knows for sure yet.
> And intelligence is not only connected to emotions. There appears to > be a very specific connection between emotions and moral reasoning.
The essence of living is survival, and in most animals, survival is assisted by the pain - pleasure system. They have an automatic "moral code" of behavior, based on pain and pleasure. In Human terms, survival is not automatic; that is the price for having volition - the ability to choose. A moral code, is geared towards not just survival, but survival in the best possible way available to a human individual as a rational being.
Since 'morality' is a guide to the values a living creature requires, one must ask how something that is not living, can possibly relate to those values. Our desire to live is simply the result of millions of years of weeding out all those that didn't care to live. Emotions such as fear, or aggression or empathy loyalty and love, are the result of survival of living beings, and the death of the remainder.
Once volition is involved, it is possible to rationally examine the appropriateness of our emotions. Getting back to machines and emotions, where is the link between their artificial feelings, and the requirements of survival of a human? In what rational way, could such a machine have what we call a moral code? -- Arnold
> > And intelligence is not only connected to emotions. There appears to > > be a very specific connection between emotions and moral reasoning.
> The essence of living is survival, and in most animals, survival is assisted > by the pain - pleasure system. They have an automatic "moral code" of > behavior, based on pain and pleasure.
Exactly. They avoid pain and seek pleasure just like us. There are odd exceptions to the rule though (e.g. I wouldn't want to be a a male praying mantis having sex :). There is also instinct which is behavior that somehow became hardwired via natural selection.
> In Human terms, survival is not automatic; that is the price for having > volition - the ability to choose.
While their methodology for choosing isn't as complex animals choose too.
> A moral code, is geared towards not just > survival, but survival in the best possible way available to a human > individual as a rational being.
So what you are saying is if a principle geared towards survival didn't appear well suited for it... you'd consider adopting a different principle ;)
> Since 'morality' is a guide to the values a living creature requires, one > must ask how something that is not living, can possibly relate to those > values. Our desire to live is simply the result of millions of years of > weeding out all those that didn't care to live.
Natural selection doesn't mean they didn't care to live. It just means they weren't suited for live (given the conditions of the moment)
> Emotions such as fear, or > aggression or empathy loyalty and love, are the result of survival of living > beings, and the death of the remainder.
> Once volition is involved, it is possible to rationally examine the > appropriateness of our emotions.
It's true emotions of the moment alone don't decide everything for an intelligent being. There is interplay with reason. While I love ice cream, I don't eat buckets of it every day because I know I'll become unhealthy.
However, my chief motivating factor is still emotion on some level. I don't want the unpleasantness of a shorter death. (or diabetes, or being fat). Even cases of "fasting" are emotions at work. While it might seem someone is denying themselves pleasure... they are doing it because they see the promise of a greater pleasure later on ("heaven")
> Getting back to machines and emotions, where is the link between their artificial feelings, and the requirements of survival of a human?
I'm not sure what you mean.
Mal and I were briefly discussing this on another thread. I brought up the point that artificial intelligence might potentially represent a future form of government for man. Suppose machines became capable of running an economy far more efficiently than men (which I believe would require moral judgment.... which I believe in turn requires something approximating feelings). Suppose these machines could produce goods, technology and services that we ourselves could not manage by ourselves. Would we chose to still run our economies or would we hand them over to benevolent dictator machines?
> In what rational way, could such a machine have what we call a moral code?
I couldn't tell you a precise methodology but IMO (as per above) my guess for the best approach to machine intelligence capable of a moral code would be examining precisely how the human brain behaves on the tiniest neurological level and duplicating the behavior with software. (although it will probably need some senses to interact with the "real" world too for data input since creating a virtual description of the reality would be too tedious and incomplete)
It took humans hundreds of millions of years of evolution to get as advanced as we are. If we want to speed up the process with silicon based intelligence copying what's already there is probably the best method. One of the complaint about neural nets at the moment (as applied to AI) is that there isn't enough information of how the brain works yet to accurately simulate it (which makes the research rather random and somewhat fruitless beyond insect-like behavior)
> So what you are saying is if a principle geared towards survival > didn't appear well suited for it... you'd consider adopting a > different principle ;)
Of course. Reality is the decider of what is best for the desired result.
>> Since 'morality' is a guide to the values a living creature requires, one >> must ask how something that is not living, can possibly relate to those >> values. Our desire to live is simply the result of millions of years of >> weeding out all those that didn't care to live.
> Natural selection doesn't mean they didn't care to live. It just means > they weren't suited for live (given the conditions of the moment)
Both really, because you need a desire to live in the first place - the survival instinct.
>> Getting back to machines and emotions, where is the link between their >> artificial feelings, and the requirements of survival of a human?
> I'm not sure what you mean.
> Mal and I were briefly discussing this on another thread. I brought up > the point that artificial intelligence might potentially represent a > future form of government for man. Suppose machines became capable of > running an economy far more efficiently than men (which I believe > would require moral judgment.... which I believe in turn requires > something approximating feelings). Suppose these machines could > produce goods, technology and services that we ourselves could not > manage by ourselves. Would we chose to still run our economies or > would we hand them over to benevolent dictator machines?
You are making big leaps here. We are not talking of machines of production, but machines that can feel and make moral decisions. First you need to consider the MEANING of morality. This is what I have been leading up to. Tell me what you think moroality IS, if not what I am saying.
>> In what rational way, could such a machine have what we call a moral >> code?
> I couldn't tell you a precise methodology but IMO (as per above) my > guess for the best approach to machine intelligence capable of a moral > code would be examining precisely how the human brain behaves on the > tiniest neurological level and duplicating the behavior with software. > (although it will probably need some senses to interact with the > "real" world too for data input since creating a virtual description > of the reality would be too tedious and incomplete)
I mean, how can 'morality' have a meaning to a machine, not how you would attempt to create it. Morality is a code of values for living rational beings. How do you propose to transpose that premise to a dead machine? First you need to explain WHY we need a morality, and then describe what it is. You will find that these explanations will have no applications to dead things. Dead things don't die, so have no need for values that sustain life, that is, morality. In short, you make gross assumptions that there is no difference between man and machine, just because we have certain aspects of similarity, such as the ability to calculate.
Potroast wrote: > On Nov 8, 2:33 pm, Rod Nibbe <use...@rknibbe.com> wrote:
>>Potroast wrote: >>>On Nov 7, 11:52 pm, Les Cargill <lcargil...@comcast.net> wrote: >>>If I had to guess I think the trick to better understanding feelings >>>will be getting down to the nitty gritty resolution of something like >>>a neuron and how it interacts with other neurons And just as our >>>brain can be broken down to a collection of smaller similar neurons... >>>neurons can themselves can be broken down into smaller repetitive >>>structures. >>Can you provide your source of evidence for this? >>I'm not a neuroscientist but I know something about >>the structure of a basic (there are many types) >>neuron, and it is not divisible into "smaller >>repetitive structures". > I'm not sure I understand your question Rod. Proteins aren't > repetitive? Dendrites aren't repetitive? DNA is not repetitive?
I find it odd that you would refer to the myriad components that constitute a thing as "smaller repetitive structures" of the thing. Your wording indicated - to me anyway - a misunderstanding of the structure of a neuron, as if to say that if you contunually divided the neuron you'd see its structure "repeated" in the smaller pieces. Which isn't true of a neuron, or any other cell type.
From here you segued into Mandelbrot sets, which are self-similar on magnification, but neurons aren't.
Or perhaps you merely meant that many *copies* of certain biomolecules that constitute certain structural components of a neuron are necessary to make those components, which *is* true, and if that's what you meant I'll move along. But I'd still consider your verbiage quirky.
> Potroast wrote: > > On Nov 8, 2:33 pm, Rod Nibbe <use...@rknibbe.com> wrote:
> >>Potroast wrote: > >>>On Nov 7, 11:52 pm, Les Cargill <lcargil...@comcast.net> wrote: > >>>If I had to guess I think the trick to better understanding feelings > >>>will be getting down to the nitty gritty resolution of something like > >>>a neuron and how it interacts with other neurons And just as our > >>>brain can be broken down to a collection of smaller similar neurons... > >>>neurons can themselves can be broken down into smaller repetitive > >>>structures. > >>Can you provide your source of evidence for this? > >>I'm not a neuroscientist but I know something about > >>the structure of a basic (there are many types) > >>neuron, and it is not divisible into "smaller > >>repetitive structures". > > I'm not sure I understand your question Rod. Proteins aren't > > repetitive? Dendrites aren't repetitive? DNA is not repetitive?
> I find it odd that you would refer to the myriad > components that constitute a thing as "smaller > repetitive structures" of the thing. Your wording > indicated - to me anyway - a misunderstanding of > the structure of a neuron, as if to say that if > you contunually divided the neuron you'd see its > structure "repeated" in the smaller pieces. Which > isn't true of a neuron, or any other cell type.
Judging by your own wording above, you seem to be injecting the word identical where I said "repetitive". For example, a neuron doesn't have a single dendrite. It has dendrites (plural). It has synapses (plural). It has neurotransmitters.(plural). Ribosomes (plural) Even for structures within it that don't appear repetitive (e.g. the nucleus of neuron) ... when we go tinier they too are made up of repetitive structures. You are looking at things from a biological resolution. The complex shapes that make up matter are ultimately all made of collections of repeating atoms and molecules. (but those repetitive patterns aren't alway necessarily only limited to the atomic world)
Where I think some semantic confusion lays between us is I see something can be repetitive and similar without being perfectly identical. (although something can of course be repetitive and identical as well). I don't typically like using the word identical for the specific reason anything can be argued different if someone chooses to ignore the essence of a particular argument. For instance even an atom of the same element has particles in different positions or speed at any given moment from another atom of the same element (which would invalidate Mandelbrot sets in nature if one took it to the absolute definition of perfectly identical as opposed to my similar)
> From here you segued into Mandelbrot sets, which > are self-similar on magnification, but neurons > aren't.
Neurons have been compared to Mandelbrot sets in their relationship with other neurons. Constituent components of neurons have ALSO been compared to Mandelbrot sets by experts in the field (so it's not just me saying it). Where I think some confusion might lay is you think I'm implying a single repeating structure when it might be multiple ones working together (although I would add on super tiny scales it may actually turn out to be a single repeating structure)
For example, a dendrite "tree" is not dissimilar to the growth pattern of trees (thus the words "dendrite"and "tree" to describe them). Both human tissue and trees have been compared to Mandelbrots sets (by experts in each respective field)
"In the present study we apply fractal analysis to this unsolved problem and calculate the fractal dimension for each dendritic arbour of a neuron. We will hereby prove that by application of fractal analysis to the dendritic arbours of these cells whilst ignoring other neuronal attributes allows for clear discrimination of only three cell types."
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi¶T0G-4PD4XHV-2&_user &_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId 85000721&_rerunOrigin=google&_acctÀ00050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_useri d &md5 57abc43e3fd11d222c674e9edf5fd6
> Or perhaps you merely meant that many *copies* of > certain biomolecules that constitute certain structural > components of a neuron are necessary to make those > components, which *is* true, and if that's what you > meant I'll move along. But I'd still consider your > verbiage quirky.
The designers of one of the first 3d landscape programs that used polygons specifically credited Mandelbrot for their inspiration. The same is true for the designers of some kinds of computer neural networks.
Potroast wrote: > On Nov 9, 2:24 am, Rod Nibbe <use...@rknibbe.com> wrote: >>Potroast wrote: >>>On Nov 8, 2:33 pm, Rod Nibbe <use...@rknibbe.com> wrote: >>>>Potroast wrote: >>>>>On Nov 7, 11:52 pm, Les Cargill <lcargil...@comcast.net> wrote: >>>>>If I had to guess I think the trick to better understanding feelings >>>>>will be getting down to the nitty gritty resolution of something like >>>>>a neuron and how it interacts with other neurons And just as our >>>>>brain can be broken down to a collection of smaller similar neurons... >>>>>neurons can themselves can be broken down into smaller repetitive >>>>>structures. >>>>Can you provide your source of evidence for this? >>>>I'm not a neuroscientist but I know something about >>>>the structure of a basic (there are many types) >>>>neuron, and it is not divisible into "smaller >>>>repetitive structures". >>>I'm not sure I understand your question Rod. Proteins aren't >>>repetitive? Dendrites aren't repetitive? DNA is not repetitive? >>I find it odd that you would refer to the myriad >>components that constitute a thing as "smaller >>repetitive structures" of the thing. Your wording >>indicated - to me anyway - a misunderstanding of >>the structure of a neuron, as if to say that if >>you contunually divided the neuron you'd see its >>structure "repeated" in the smaller pieces. Which >>isn't true of a neuron, or any other cell type. > Judging by your own wording above, you seem to be injecting the word > identical where I said "repetitive". For example, a neuron doesn't > have a single dendrite. It has dendrites (plural). It has synapses > (plural). It has neurotransmitters.(plural). Ribosomes (plural) Even > for structures within it that don't appear repetitive (e.g. the > nucleus of neuron) ... when we go tinier they too are made up of > repetitive structures. You are looking at things from a biological > resolution. The complex shapes that make up matter are ultimately all > made of collections of repeating atoms and molecules.
Uh, right, I'm well aware of the prevailing atomic model of matter. So on your view, since all matter is ultimately made of atoms, therefore all matter is constituted of "smaller repetitive structures."
Pretty quirky verbiage if you ask me.
You know what they say, "A concept which describes everything distinguishes nothing."
> Potroast wrote: > > On Nov 9, 2:24 am, Rod Nibbe <use...@rknibbe.com> wrote: > >>Potroast wrote: > >>>On Nov 8, 2:33 pm, Rod Nibbe <use...@rknibbe.com> wrote: > >>>>Potroast wrote: > >>>>>On Nov 7, 11:52 pm, Les Cargill <lcargil...@comcast.net> wrote: > >>>>>If I had to guess I think the trick to better understanding feelings > >>>>>will be getting down to the nitty gritty resolution of something like > >>>>>a neuron and how it interacts with other neurons And just as our > >>>>>brain can be broken down to a collection of smaller similar neurons... > >>>>>neurons can themselves can be broken down into smaller repetitive > >>>>>structures. > >>>>Can you provide your source of evidence for this? > >>>>I'm not a neuroscientist but I know something about > >>>>the structure of a basic (there are many types) > >>>>neuron, and it is not divisible into "smaller > >>>>repetitive structures". > >>>I'm not sure I understand your question Rod. Proteins aren't > >>>repetitive? Dendrites aren't repetitive? DNA is not repetitive? > >>I find it odd that you would refer to the myriad > >>components that constitute a thing as "smaller > >>repetitive structures" of the thing. Your wording > >>indicated - to me anyway - a misunderstanding of > >>the structure of a neuron, as if to say that if > >>you contunually divided the neuron you'd see its > >>structure "repeated" in the smaller pieces. Which > >>isn't true of a neuron, or any other cell type. > > Judging by your own wording above, you seem to be injecting the word > > identical where I said "repetitive". For example, a neuron doesn't > > have a single dendrite. It has dendrites (plural). It has synapses > > (plural). It has neurotransmitters.(plural). Ribosomes (plural) Even > > for structures within it that don't appear repetitive (e.g. the > > nucleus of neuron) ... when we go tinier they too are made up of > > repetitive structures. You are looking at things from a biological > > resolution. The complex shapes that make up matter are ultimately all > > made of collections of repeating atoms and molecules.
> Uh, right, I'm well aware of the prevailing atomic > model of matter. So on your view, since all matter > is ultimately made of atoms, therefore all matter is > constituted of "smaller repetitive structures."
In a sense yes! This is essentially what atomists philosophized about. Of course atoms have turned out more complicated than first imagined. The standard model can't account for everything so the naming may have been premature (e.g. maybe if strings pan out they would have been better named atoms)
Again though, that's far from the only thing I'm saying here. Patterns can also be stacked on top of other patterns. And running with the case of specifically fractals, while natural fractals can't really be described as "perfectly identical"....self "similar" fractals do exist in the natural world. This is exactly why we can create forests that look organic and realistic using software based on simple rules. (landscape is another great example) The list of natural shapes that follow fractal approximations is quite extensive.
Fractal analysis is a quite common approach for trying to determining the shape of tiny biological structures. It's "pretty quirky verbiage" to suggest fractals have nothing in common with neurons when plenty of examples exist that contradict your speculative assumption :) A Google search of the terms +"fractal analysis" +neurons gave me more than 19,000 hits (the pluses meaning both terms are present).
The general theme of my thesis is that the complexity of intelligence is really a collection of smaller simpler rules stacked on top of one another that both repeat (on enormous scales) and interact with one another (as opposed to some giant super algorithm thats supposed to account for every scenario humans encounter). This programming approach appears logical to me since that's how our body seems to work. We are collections of different kinds of repeating cells that form more complex structures (e.g. a skin, a brain, a skeleton, a lung, a heart, and finally a human).
(From my perspective) the reason why AI's currently don't "understand" is because those smaller simple rules aren't being followed (not that I'm saying I know what those rules are). Trying to make a computer understand at the moment is like trying to get a frog to understand. Frogs can't understand because some of the underlaying simple repetitive rules are different than that of a human (which ends up as them with the properties of frogs as opposed to humans).
Likewise... an AI will never truly understand like a human unless we first understand our own simple repeating principles. Software today can only mimick creativity in narrow bands of task-oriented behavior. While we could create something that appeared intelligent using the current approach (given enough lines of code) IMO even if one eventually passed the Turing test with flying colours it wouldn't be an iota more intelligent than any computer is today (in the human sense).
Incidentally...this approach to AI isn't my own theory. Plenty of researchers for decades have taken this avenue. It isn't popular in mainstream programming yet for one simple reason. We usually can't get a computer to do much useful using this method. However, the reason why that is seems fairly evident. Even if the rules are simple, given the number of possible mathematical permutations possible unless we know our own set of rules first... the probability is extremely low we'll randomly stumble upon the code for intelligence beyond very simple tasks. (although if the horsepower of advanced quantum computing ever arrives...we might be able to use the trial-and-error simulation approach)
Sorry Rod. I noticed an error I made after posting.
I stated "A search of +fractals +neurons returned 1.9 million hits". The number is roughly 1.2 million hits. (The difference isn't relevant but it gets under my skin when I see other people post inaccurate figures).
Potroast wrote: > On Nov 10, 1:06 pm, Rod Nibbe <use...@rknibbe.com> wrote: > Fractal analysis is a quite common approach for trying to determining > the shape of tiny biological structures.
Your point was specifically about neurons, not many "tiny biological structures".
> It's "pretty quirky > verbiage" to suggest fractals have nothing in common with neurons when > plenty of examples exist that contradict your speculative > assumption :)
Not only was that *not* my assumption, I provided no verbiage whatsoever which would suggest to any honest reader that it was my assumption. I have nothing to say to you about the application of fractal analysis to the study of neurons. I can, however, tell you that the state-of-the-art way to determine the 3D structure (shape) of many important biomolecules is by x-ray crystallography and nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy.
Indeed...
> A Google search of the terms +"fractal analysis" > +neurons gave me more than 19,000 hits (the pluses meaning both terms > are present).
... looking at the abstract referred to by the first link in this list, it appears the authors applied fractal analysis to the study of action potential patterns in certain neurons, *not* to model the structure (shape) of those neurons. Do you understand the difference? I do.
On Nov 10, 7:47 pm, Rod Nibbe <use...@rknibbe.com> wrote:
> Potroast wrote: > > It's "pretty quirky > > verbiage" to suggest fractals have nothing in common with neurons when > > plenty of examples exist that contradict your speculative > > assumption :)
> Not only was that *not* my assumption, I provided > no verbiage whatsoever which would suggest to any > honest reader that it was my assumption.
I've elaborated on several aspects of neurons structure (which should have made it clear I'm not implying that you'll find a tiny neuron chopped up)... yet you seemed to continued to try and dismiss any connection to fractals throughout this thread.
e.g " Your wording indicated - to me anyway - a misunderstanding of the structure of a neuron, as if to say that if you contunually divided the neuron you'd see its structure "repeated" in the smaller pieces. Which isn't true of a neuron, or any other cell type. "
e.g. "From here you segued into Mandelbrot sets, which are self- similar on magnification, but neurons aren't. "
e.g. " So on your view, since all matter is ultimately made of atoms, therefore all matter is constituted of "smaller repetitive structures. Pretty quirky verbiage if you ask me."
e.g. "You know what they say, "A concept which describes everything distinguishes nothing."
> I have nothing > to say to you about the application of fractal analysis > to the study of neurons. I can, however, tell you that > the state-of-the-art way to determine the 3D structure > (shape) of many important biomolecules is by x-ray > crystallography and nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) > spectroscopy.
> Indeed...
> > A Google search of the terms +"fractal analysis" > > +neurons gave me more than 19,000 hits (the pluses meaning both terms > > are present).
> ... looking at the abstract referred to by the first > link in this list, it appears the authors applied > fractal analysis to the study of action potential > patterns in certain neurons, *not* to model the > structure (shape) of those neurons. Do you understand > the difference? I do.
Shape alone isn't the only way I'm considering fractals here. There are fractals to be found in all sorts of other properties (e.g time, motion, etc...). In addition, the principle of fractals doesn't necessarily have to be taken to an absolute. Something can behave like a fractal for certain dimensional or period constraints
In either case... isn't the fact they are using fractal analysis (that's explicitly used to determine repeating patterns) my whole point here? Was I arguing how a computer chip should be "shaped".... or was I using fractals as an argument that using simple repeating code to build AI software makes sense because it duplicates aspects of our brain? (and aspects of our biology in general)
And if you Google some more you'll see fractals can also be used to determine the shape of neurons (or at least some aspects of them) You'll find plenty of references to the shape of dendritic trees/ arbors and axon branching being compared to fractals.
"In the present study we apply fractal analysis to this unsolved problem and calculate the fractal dimension for each dendritic arbour of a neuron. We will hereby prove that by application of fractal analysis to the dendritic arbours of these cells whilst ignoring other neuronal attributes allows for clear discrimination of only three cell types."
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&_udi¶T0G-4PD4XHV-2&_user &_rdoc=1&_fmt=&_orig=search&_sort=d&_docanchor=&view=c&_searchStrId 85000721&_rerunOrigin=google&_acctÀ00050221&_version=1&_urlVersion=0&_useri d &md5 57abc43e3fd11d222c674e9edf5fd6
"A fractal shape can be completely described by a sin- gle parameter, df, the fractal dimension (the mass of a fractal object inside a radius r scales as r 0. Objects in nature are fractal over a finite range of length scales r, typically a factor of 10 or so. Here we apply fractal analysis to retinal neurons in vivo and in vitro. we find that neutons are fractal objects over roughly a decade in r. We also suggest three possible diffusion-limited pro- cesses that could be related to the fractal shapes observed.....
"Yet another possibility might involve the creation of a fractal architecture in which multiple copies of the synfire neuronal pool arise as a result of the fractal geometry of axonal branching (Bieberich 2002). " http://cogprints.org/4432/1/single_neuron_theory.htm
My guess is there are probably more aspects in a neuron that are fractal (although I cannot confirm as this isn't my area of expertise). There are also many other aspects of our brains have also been compared to fractals.
These concepts have been applied to existing computer neural networks....using fractals patterned after dendrites and axons. (So again it ain't just me saying this.)
One more item I wish to make clear Rod. By originally bringing up Mandelbrot and "repetitive structures" I'm not only trying to bring up fractals. I'm just using him as an example (why I used the broader term "repetitive structures" instead of sticking only with fractals) There are many other ways to look at repetition other than fractals in our biology. Humans are a collection of repeating skin, bone, and other tissue.
Lets suppose we want to design a software heart that appears to beat like a human. If we took the approach of just a pulsing object that only has the appearance of a heart practical any new factors that were introduced to test whether our heart accurately simulated a real heart- would fail. We would be forced to code in behaviors one-by-one to simulate reactions.
On the other hand, a heart is made up of all sorts of repeating cells. Thus if we designed software that simulated a heart on a cellular and physics level the simulation (if written correctly) would result in a heart capable of beating naturally. (as well as reacting to other stimuli as a human heart might). Behaviors wouldn't need to be explicitly coded.
I'm applying the same concept to intelligence. Why machines can't think well is because we are building them with superficial hearts. We could keep adding behaviors (what we currently do) but this isn't the way a heart works. The more sensible way (if we wish to simulate actual intelligence rather than just mimic behaviors one-by-one) would be to duplicate how our brain works on a microscopic level. This way human-like behavioral tendencies would arise as a natural consequence rather than each have to be explicitly coded.
Or at least this is the theory any how. In practice the behavioral approach is much more practical and common because it solves immediate problems, Over time more and more behaviors are being added to computers so that one of these days we are probably going to have have computers that seem intelligent. but the principles of that "intelligence" function fundamentally differently than humans. A real AI isn't only one that passes a Turing test but one where behaviors aren't explicitly coded.
There are two big challenges in this approach
a. Can we create a software brain with similar structure to a human one? This is extremely challenging but I see no reason why not (eventually).
b. Can we define the underlaying physics accurately enough for that brain to function like a human? This one is a wild card. Since we lack an absolute understanding of physics perhaps our brain would never end up completely in the range of a human-like behavior.
> a. Can we create a software brain with similar structure to a human > one? This is extremely challenging but I see no reason why not > (eventually).
> b. Can we define the underlaying physics accurately enough for that > brain to function like a human? This one is a wild card. Since we lack > an absolute understanding of physics perhaps our brain would never end > up completely in the range of a human-like behavior.
These 'challenges' will lead to the same end as neural nets and other present day approaches to creating AI - nowhere.
The correct approach is to first discover how the mind works. The challenge is not to duplicate the brain but to recreate the mind.
> > a. Can we create a software brain with similar structure to a human > > one? This is extremely challenging but I see no reason why not > > (eventually).
> > b. Can we define the underlaying physics accurately enough for that > > brain to function like a human? This one is a wild card. Since we lack > > an absolute understanding of physics perhaps our brain would never end > > up completely in the range of a human-like behavior.
> These 'challenges' will lead to the same end as neural nets and other > present day approaches to creating AI - nowhere.
> The correct approach is to first discover how the mind works. > The challenge is not to duplicate the brain but to recreate the mind.
When I say "brain" I'm not saying the computer needs to have the physical characteristics of brain. AI software is not physical and ultimately is intended to mimic operational not physical structure. However, there is no way to go from a to z convincingly without first observing, experimenting, and understanding what's physically there (our own brains). How do we know A-is-A unless we first define A right?
If we took only the high level behavioral approach to programming even if we had a machine that passed the Turing test we'd still forever be wondering if it was really "intelligent" (in the human sense). What would distinguish it as suddenly "Intelligent" versus prior generations that simply had less lines of code? A piece of software that was programmed to work on micro principles similar to the brain... that subsequently started to behave like humans do without being instructed how to do so... would be a far more convincing argument we understood the finer mechanisms of consciousness..
In any case, we appear to be saying much the same thing in terms of ultimate goal despite different descriptions.